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Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law 
 
Jonathan Macey* and Leo E. Strine, Jr.** 
 
“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing 
only in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers 
upon it.”   
 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 635 (1819) 
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The most important constitutional case of the new millennium is based on a 
fundamental misconception about the nature of the corporation.  Citizens United v. 
FEC,1 which prohibited the government from restricting independent expenditures 
                                                 
1 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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for corporate communications,2 and held that corporations enjoy the same free 
speech rights to engage in political spending as human citizens, is grounded on the 
erroneous theory that corporations are “associations of citizens”3 rather than what 
they actually are: independent legal entities distinct from those who own their stock. 
From an analytical perspective, the core of Citizens United is that “the First 
Amendment . . . prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of 
citizens, for simply engaging in political speech,”4 and that corporations are properly 
conceptualized as “associations of citizens” that have “taken on the corporate 
form.”5  Citizens United held that the regulation of the speech of “disfavored 
associations of citizens—those that have taken on the corporate form” was 
unconstitutional.6 
Our contribution to the literature on Citizens United is that the case is as much 
a case about corporate law, as it is about the First Amendment.  None of the justices 
deny the importance of political speech in their various opinions about the nature, 
function, or scope of the First Amendment’s protections of free speech. Rather, their 
major dispute in Citizens United is about the applicability of settled First 
Amendment protections to a particular juridical entity, the corporation, and the scope 
                                                 
2 See id. at 349, 354, 356. 
3 See id. at 356. 
4 Id. at 349. 
5 Id. at 356. 
6 Id. 
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of the state’s ability to regulate the corporations it allows to be created and gives 
distinct legal status. 
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, views the 
corporation as an “association of citizens” and on this basis concludes that 
corporations are entitled to First Amendment protections.  Not just that, Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion holds that Congress may not take into account the distinctions 
between corporations and human beings in regulating political speech, and that 
corporations must be permitted the same freedom to speak as human beings.  In 
dissent, Justice Stevens fails directly to challenge Justice Kennedy’s existential 
conception of the corporation notwithstanding the fact that that it constitutes the core 
of the majority opinion.  This Article fills that void.  Our challenge considers and 
rejects the Citizens United majority’s conception of the corporation as an 
“associations of citizens” and reaffirms its status as an artificial, metaphysical, and 
legal construct that exists separate and apart from its investors. These investors are 
not “associated” either with one another or with the corporation in which they have 
invested any more than the various creditors of a corporation are associated with 
each other or with the debtor to which they have extended financing.  Shareholders 
simply are owners of investment interests with certain contractual rights.  They are 
not “owners” of the corporation in any sense of the word, and their relationship with 
the corporation is purely statutory and contractual.  
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The notion that the corporation is an associated group of individuals is 
misguided and at odds with objective reality.  But this counterfactual assertion that 
the business organization cannot be disentangled from the human beings who are the 
ultimate “owners” of the corporation led the majority in Citizens United to the 
conclusion that corporations have constitutional rights equal to human beings. 
Corporations are accurately viewed not as associations of citizens, but rather as 
distinct legal entities in their own right that have been formed under statute and 
authorized by law to act as autonomous “persons” with full legal responsibility.  It is 
this view of the corporation that provides the analytical justification for allowing 
corporations to enter into contracts and be sued in their own right.  On this account, 
the corporation can—and must—be distinguished analytically from its shareholders.7  
The Citizens United view of the corporation as an association of individuals is 
inconsistent with the established conception of the corporation as a juridical entity 
with limited liability.   
Under the “association of citizens” conception of the corporation advanced by 
the majority in Citizens United, the corporation is merely an extension of its 
shareholders.  This conception confuses the corporation with the general partnership 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 73 (2010) (“The corporation 
has been regarded from its inception as a legal entity distinct from its owners.”); 12B WILLIAM 
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5709 (rev. vol. 2015) 
(“A corporation is an entity distinct from its shareholders . . .”).   
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form of business organization.  In fact, the entire point of the incorporation process is 
to permit the creation of a legal entity that is not an association of individuals, but 
rather a discrete legal entity whose rights and obligations are distinct from those of it 
its creators, investors, managers, and other constituents.   
We base our argument that corporations are separate and distinct legal entities 
and that they are not “associations of citizens” as Citizens United asserts on three facts 
about the corporate form: (1) the treatment of corporations as separate legal entities is 
what distinguishes corporations from general partnerships and sole proprietorships 
and what justifies the legal notion of “limited liability” and other central 
characteristics of the corporate form, such as the ability to contract and to sue and be 
sued; (2) corporations do not have owners, they have investors who have contract-
based, financial interests in the firms and limited management rights; and (3) 
corporations are not fiction, but fact only because the law makes them real and distinct 
entities with a legal identity.  
In Part I of this Article, we discuss the nature of the corporate form by 
describing its core attributes and explain that one must infer from the nature of the 
corporate form itself that the corporation is an entity, not an association of 
individuals.  In Part II, we expand upon the analysis in Part I by examining certain 
settled legal characteristics that the Supreme Court has itself recognized to 
distinguish the corporation from other forms of business organization that can more 
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plausibly be viewed as associations of individuals.  We conclude Part II by noting a 
simple, empirical reality that cuts against Citizens United’s conception of the 
corporation as an “association of citizens”:  stockholders are not owners of the 
corporation, but rather contract claimants.   
In Part III, we discuss the reality that in most other areas of its jurisprudence 
the Supreme Court embraces the traditional entity view of the corporation, and does 
not treat corporations as associations of citizens.  Thus, Citizens United and its 
progeny are outliers, in tension with the Supreme Court’s decisional law in key areas 
like standing, tax law, criminal law, and other areas of constitutional law.  Our 
analysis shows that in the great bulk of its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court adheres 
to our view of the business corporation, which is that it is a distinct legal entity whose 
rights and obligations are subject to statutory constraint.  In fact, by long tradition, 
starting under Chief Justice Marshall,8 corporations are the opposite of Lockean–
Jeffersonian human beings endowed with inalienable rights that cannot be taken 
away by the government.9  By contrast, corporations have only those rights society 
gives them by statutory law, and any statutory law may take into account the unique 
nature of corporations in limiting their ability to act.   
                                                 
8 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, C. J.). 
9 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl (U.S. 1776); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas 
Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate 
Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 890–91 (2016) (explaining the historical conception 
of the corporation as having only the rights given to it by society, which is the polar opposite of 
human beings who have natural rights that cannot be taken away without due process of law). 
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We then point out in Part IV profound problems with Citizen United’s 
assertion that corporations are “associations of citizens.”  Namely, that assertion 
comes without supporting legal authority and for good reason.  Neither the law nor 
empirical fact supports the idea that stockholders are associated citizens, much less 
with any common political or social viewpoint. 
Part V then notes the stark difference in the Supreme Court’s approach when 
dealing with the free speech of labor unions.  In the union context, the Supreme 
Court’s principal concern has been ensuring that no union member has his dues used 
for political speech without his express authorization, and has held that it is a First 
Amendment violation to use union dues for political speech.10  Just this year, in 
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 
31,11 the Court went further and held that unions could not even collect fees to cover 
the core costs of bargaining for higher wages from a workforce member who did not 
join the union.12  In the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,13 Congress 
embraced concerns like this and gave corporations the ability to engage in political 
speech by raising funds voluntarily from stockholders for this purpose.  This means 
took into account the corporate law consensus that a stockholder’s decision to invest 
                                                 
10 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 240–42 (1977).   
11 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
12 Id. at 2486.   
13 2 U.S.C. § 441b. 
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in a business corporation does not rationally involve any authorization for the 
corporation to use treasury funds for political speech, and that stockholders are of 
diverse political viewpoints and only have a shared interest in one thing, getting a 
good return on their investment.  But, applying a starkly different viewpoint than it 
takes in cases like Abood and Janus, the Supreme Court struck down McCain-
Feingold and trivialized the substantial leeway McCain-Feingold had given for 
corporations to speak.  In analyzing this contradiction, we identify the market 
realities that make it even less plausible that 21st century American business 
corporations can be deemed “associations of citizens,” especially when most of their 
stock is owned by institutional investors, to whom American investors are in essence 
compelled to turn over their capital to save for college for their kids and retirement 
for themselves.  And we conclude Part II by noting a simple, empirical reality that 
cuts against Citizens United’s conception of the corporation as an “association of 
citizens”:  stockholders are not owners of the corporation, but rather contract 
claimants.   
Finally, in Part VI we comment on the lack of any source for the Citizens 
United majority’s view that the corporation is an association of individuals.  In 
particular, we observe that corporations are creatures of state law, not federal law.14  
As the Court observed in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., “[s]tate regulation of 
                                                 
14 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law”). 
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corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes 
are a product of state law.”15   Therefore, determinations about the nature of the 
corporation, such as whether the corporation is a distinct juridical entity or an 
association of individuals, should be made by reference to state law, not federal law.  
To further this point, we survey those forms of entities that might be more plausibly 
considered associational in form than corporations, and note that in the main, most 
of them are trending strongly toward the entity conception.  After doing so, we 
address those corporations most rationally considered to be vehicles for the shared 
viewpoints of those who form them:  non-profit corporations.  As to them, we 
highlight two features that buttress our core point.  To wit, most non-profit 
corporations are member corporations and do not even have stockholders.  And as 
important, these corporations do not fund their speech using the entrusted capital of 
their members or stockholders.  Rather, they speak using funds they raise specifically 
for that purpose from donors—exactly the method that Congress left open to 
corporations in McCain-Feingold and that the Citizens United majority said 
constituted a total ban on corporate speech. 
We conclude by noticing an irony.  It was the legislative branch, not the 
judicial branch that is supposedly more learned in the law, that was the one that 
understood corporate law when addressing political speech.  Congress considered 
                                                 
15 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). 
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the nature of corporations when enacting McCain-Feingold and took into account 
that corporations are not associations of citizens, but separate, state-created entities 
formed for reasons that cannot be rationally attributed to the shared political or 
philosophical views of their investors.  As such, Congress allowed corporations 
broad freedom to engage in political speech, but only by using funds voluntarily 
contributed for this purpose by stockholders to a corporate-controlled political action 
committee (PAC).  By this means, Congress left ample room for the corporation to 
act as a collective vehicle for stockholders who wished to affiliate for that purpose, 
but protected other stockholders from being forced to subsidize speech that the mere 
decision to invest cannot plausibly be thought to endorse.  By contrast, the Supreme 
Court ignored, or misunderstood, the traditional corporate law concept of the 
corporation and thereby subjected millions of American investors to suffer the 
involuntary use of their entrusted capital for speech that has no rational connection 
to their decision to buy stock.  That is bad corporate law making bad constitutional 
law.  
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118 
12 
 
I. The Nature of the Corporation: Economics, Law, and Citizens United 
Citizens United involved a test of the constitutionality of Section 203 of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold),16 a federal law 
prohibiting corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make 
independent expenditures for speech that is either an “electioneering communication” 
or that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate.17  McCain-Feingold 
defined an electioneering communication as any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office that is 
made within 30 days of a primary election and that is publicly distributed. 
Much has been written about the facts of Citizens United.  Sufficient for 
present purposes is to point out that the procedural history of the case makes clear 
that the Citizens United majority sought to use the case to make a broad statement 
about the ability of all corporations to engage in political speech.  Although there 
were narrower ways to resolve the precise case before the Court, because it involved 
a non-profit corporation and unusual facts,18 it is inarguable that the majority wanted 
                                                 
16 2 U.S.C. § 441b. 
17 Id. 
18 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–22 (noting that “Citizens United is a nonprofit corporation” 
with “an annual budget of about $12 million” accrued mostly “from donations by individuals”).  
Several scholars have noted that the Court could have resolved Citizens United on narrower 
grounds.  See Laurence H. Tribe, Dividing Citizens United: The Case v. The Controversy 30 
CONST. COMMENT. 463, 473 (2015) (“From the initial briefing to the final argument, the Court 
greatly expanded the scope of the issues presented. And in its decision, the Court dodged 
a multitude of paths to a narrower ruling.”); Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens 
United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 415 (2013) (“[Citizens United] was written 
with a broad brush, turning its back on several plausible narrower grounds for decision”). 
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to issue a ruling to address the kind of corporations that are most common and most 
wealthy:  business corporations that are formed with the goal of making profits.  For 
our purposes, therefore, we focus much of our discussion on business corporations, 
as these are the corporations with massive wealth that Congress was most concerned 
with regulating in McCain-Feingold. 
In Citizens United, the majority struck down the provision of McCain-
Feingold that prohibited corporations from making expenditures in favor of the 
election or defeat of political candidates, except through corporate-sponsored 
PACs.19  In so doing, the majority rejected the idea, which we will come back to, 
that Congress had not prohibited corporate speech, but had solely put into place 
regulations about how corporations could speak that took into account the factual 
differences between corporations and human beings.  In particular, Citizens United 
did so by giving no weight to the provisions in McCain-Feingold that allowed 
corporations to establish and solicit contributions to “a separate segregated fund to 
be utilized for political purposes.”20  Under those provisions, corporations could 
solicit voluntary contributions from key corporate constituencies, in particular 
                                                 
19 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (“It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by 
authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any 
election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention 
or caucus held to select candidates for any political office.”). 
20 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2).   
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stockholders and employees.21  But, corporations could not use treasury funds 
directly to engage in electioneering.22   
McCain-Feingold sought to ensure that only funds voluntarily contributed by 
stockholders were used by corporate speech.  McCain-Feingold represented no 
revolution in legislative techniques designed to constrain the operation of business 
corporations.  For much of the 19th century, corporations could only engage in a 
merger with unanimous consent of the stockholders, and the appraisal right arose 
when that stringent rule was tempered.23  And when general incorporation statutes 
were enacted, courts used the ultra vires doctrine to forbid the use of corporate funds 
for political and charitable purposes, on the grounds that these were not purposes 
                                                 
21 See id. (excluding the “solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized 
for political purposes” from the definition of “contribution or expenditure”); id. § 30118(b)(4)(A) 
(prohibiting such a separate segregated fund from soliciting contributions “from any person other 
than its stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their 
families”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 415–16 (“Under BCRA, any corporation's ‘stockholders 
and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families’ can pool their 
resources to finance electioneering communications.  A significant and growing number of 
corporations avail themselves of this option; during the most recent election cycle, corporate and 
union PACs raised nearly a billion dollars.  Administering a PAC entails some administrative 
burden, but so does complying with the disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements that the 
Court today upholds, and no one has suggested that the burden is severe for a sophisticated for-
profit corporation.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
22 See 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a).   
23 Norwood P. Beveridge, Interested Director Contracts at Common Law: Validation Under the 
Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 97, 109 (1999) (corporate law required 
unanimous consent of stockholders for “extraordinary transactions,” citing People v. Ballard, 32 
N.E. 54, 59 (N.Y. 1892), and Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, 590–93 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1861)) 
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within the corporation’s stated purposes.24  And once generally chartered business 
corporations began to get involved in politics, federal and state regulation to limit 
their ability to use their wealth to influence elections quickly arose and was validated 
by the courts.25 
But as we will note later, the Citizens United majority ignored how 
corporations do business in general; the Court viewed McCain-Feingold as too 
burdensome, because the corporation had to create a distinct entity and account for 
it.  Additionally, the Court concluded that “[a] PAC is a separate association from 
the corporation[,] [s]o the PAC exemption from [McCain-Feingold’s] expenditure 
ban . . . does not allow corporations to speak.”26  That is, Citizens United gave 
dismissive treatment to Congress’s authorization for corporations to engage in 
speech by acting as a collective action device to “associate” those stockholders who 
had a common desire to speak through the corporation, and insisted that the 
corporation as a distinct entity had to be allowed to speak directly using treasury 
funds.  In doing so, the Court ignored the reality that most large business 
                                                 
24 See generally Albert J. Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corporation and the Doctrine of Ultra 
Vires, 35 YALE L.J. 13 (1925). 
25 Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling 
Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 890–93 (2016) 
(documenting this history).   
26 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38 (“PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to 
administer and subject to extensive regulations.  For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, 
forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons 
making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report 
changes to this information within 10 days.”).   
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corporations form specific corporations—subsidiaries—to pursue their various 
business lines and to achieve the benefits that come with the law’s recognition of 
these subsidiaries as having a distinct legal identity.  The McCain-Feingold PAC 
exemption involved no burden that corporations like Exxon-Mobil and Apple do not 
happily accept all the time.  Having trivialized the means Congress gave to 
corporations to speak using its ability to aggregate contributions voluntarily from its 
supposedly “associated” stockholders, the Citizens United majority then pronounced 
McCain-Feingold “an outright ban” on political speech by corporations.27  Because 
of its own strained conclusion that McCain-Feingold acted as a total ban, the 
majority then found it easy to conclude that Congress had violated the First 
Amendment.  But as an empirical matter, the idea that before Citizens United 
corporations were subject to a “total ban” on political speech is fanciful.  Whatever 
a “total ban” means, a situation where our politics are awash in corporate money is 
not a “total ban.”28   
                                                 
27 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38.   
28 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 
101 GEO. L.J. 923, 930–37 (presenting evidence of significant corporate political spending before 
Citizens United); Tilman Klumpp et al., The Business of American Democracy: Citizens United, 
Independent Spending, and Elections, 59 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2016) (documenting the role of corporate 
money in politics before and after Citizens United); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, 
Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657 (2012); 
Eleanor Neff Powell & Justin Grimmer, Money in Exile: Campaign Contributions and Committee 
Access, 78 J. POL. 974 (2016) (presenting empirical evidence from 1980 through 2012 that business 
interests seek short-term access to influential legislators through campaign contributions to 
committee members); Alexander Fouirnaies & Andrew B. Hall, How Do Interest Groups Seek 
Access to Committees?, 62 AM. J. POL. SCI. 132 (2017) (providing similar evidence in the context 
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Citizens United ignored the entity theory of the corporation and adopted a view 
that the corporation is an aggregate of its shareholders.  As Adam Winkler trenchantly 
observed, “not once” did Justice Kennedy in his opinion “mention corporate 
personhood.  He never said that corporations were people and nothing in his opinion 
turned on that notion:”29 
Corporate personhood—the idea that a corporation is an entity with 
rights and obligations separate and distinct from the rights and 
obligations of its members—is entirely missing from the court’s opinion.  
The court afforded broad free speech rights to corporation, but not 
because they were people.  Instead . . . the Citizens United decision 
obscured the corporate entity and emphasized the rights of others, like 
shareholders and listeners. 
 
Citizens United repeatedly described the corporation as “an association 
that has taken on the corporate form.”30 
 
Citizens United treats the corporation as “a mere collection of men,”31 
attributing the rights and responsibilities of the corporation’s shareholders to the 
corporation itself.32  This analysis confuses the general partnership form of business 
organization, which is an association of partners, whose individual rights and 
                                                 
of U.S. state legislatures, using data from 1988 through 2014); HEIDI WELSH & ROBIN YOUNG, 
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS INST., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF POLITICAL EXPENDITURES: 2011 
BENCHMARK REPORT ON S&P 500 COMPANIES 2 (2011), http:// 
www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Political_Spending_Report_Nov_10_2011.pdf (“S&P 500 companies 
allocated $979.3 million (87 percent) of the $1.1 billion they gave in 2010 to [federal] lobbying. 
They spent a further $112 million (10 percent) on state level candidates, parties and ballot 
initiatives and $31 million (3 percent) on federally registered political committees.”). 
29 ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS 364 (2018). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349, 354, 356 (referring to corporations as “associations of 
citizens”).  
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responsibilities are indistinguishable from those of the entity, with the corporate form 
of business organization, which is a separate juridical entity with distinct rights and 
responsibilities.  The rights and responsibilities of corporations are limited by the 
states that create the legal framework that allows them to come into existence and 
regulates their activities. 
A. The Nexus of Contracts Theory 
Just as the aggregate theory and the entity theory provide two ways to view the 
corporation through a legal lens, the “nexus of contracts” theory and the “separation 
of ownership and control” theory provide two ways to view the corporation through a 
theoretical economic lens.33  There is a critical analytical difference, however, 
between the theoretical economic view of the corporation and what should be the fact-
based legal view of the corporation.  Specifically, the economic views of the 
corporation are not mutually exclusive: one can logically view the corporation 
simultaneously both as a nexus of contracts and as an organization characterized by 
the separation of ownership and control.   
                                                 
33 Sometimes as a matter of description, three theories of the corporation have been identified.  These 
theories “are the aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or 
shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a creature of the State; 
and the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an 
extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers.”  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2010) (describing these 
as the “standard theories found in literature,” and citing David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 201).  But both the creature of the state theory and the real entity theory view the 
corporations as separate entities.  These theories are not logically distinguishable, and the fact is 
that corporations are real because the state makes them so. 
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In contrast, the legal conceptions of the corporation as either a distinct entity or 
simply an aggregation of its stockholders are mutually exclusive.  As a matter of logic, 
the corporation may be conceptualized by law as either an entity or an aggregate but 
it cannot rationally be conceptualized simultaneously as both.  The entity theory and 
the aggregate theory are not complements: they are substitutes.  In fact, the entity view 
of the corporation serves as an alternative to the aggregate view. The purpose of the 
entity view is to provide a way to conceptualize the corporation that distinguishes it 
from its progenitor, the partnership form of business organization.  More precisely, 
the entity view respects the evident core purpose of society’s creation of the 
corporation: to give a corporation a legal identity distinct from any of its constituents, 
including its stockholders.  Put simply, theoretical economic conceptions of the 
corporation are not designed to describe what corporations are as a matter of law and 
thus empirical fact.  As we show, corporate law is clear about those basic questions, 
because the essential point of corporate law is to create entities distinct from their 
constituents. 
The core of the nexus of contracts theory is that the corporation is best described 
as a nexus or web of bilateral contracts between inputs of capital and labor.34  Even 
                                                 
34 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  For applications of the theory 
see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUMBIA L. REV. 
1416 (1989); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency, Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Eugene F. Fama 
& Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 30l (1983); see also 
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under this view, however, the corporation is a “legal fiction”35 in that its existence is 
dependent on the enabling authority of state legislation; that is, the law makes fact 
what would otherwise be fiction.  The basic insight of the nexus of contracts theory is 
that when the corporation is deconstructed into its component parts all that one 
observes is a constellation of contracts that describe the relationship of the various 
firms and humans who have claims on the cash flows of the enterprise.   
Here we make two points about the contractual theory of the corporation as it 
relates to the conception of the corporation embedded in Citizens United.  First, 
although the nexus of contracts conception of the corporation has much to recommend 
it as an analytical tool, this theory is incomplete because it envisions a counter-factual 
world in which the state does not exist.  Second, the nexus of contracts theory is not 
actually a theory of the corporation.  Rather, it is a meta-theory that describes all forms 
of business organization, including partnerships and sole proprietorships.  As such, 
the nexus of contracts theory is inconsistent with the “association of individuals” 
conception of the corporation found in Citizens United because the nexus of contracts 
theory treats all of the various contractual inputs to the corporation, whether they be 
suppliers of equity or debt or labor, as equal.  In contrast, the “association of 
                                                 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Reinier 
H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 
(1984); Kenneth E. Scott, Corporate Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance 
Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983). 
35 William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORN. 
L. REV. 407, 409 (1989). 
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individuals” theory inexplicably exalts the role of shareholders over other constituents 
of the corporate enterprise in a way that is inconsistent with the contractual approach.   
Finally, and most importantly, we observe that, under the nexus of contracts 
theory, the various constituents to the corporation must, of course, have counter-
parties.  This counterparty is an entity, namely the corporation itself.  As such, the 
nexus of contracts theory is consistent with the entity theory.  In contrast, the nexus 
of contracts theory is inconsistent with the “association of individuals” conception of 
the corporation in Citizens United.  If the corporation were an association of 
individuals rather than a separate and cognizable legal entity unto itself, then the 
contracts made by contributors of labor and capital would be with the individuals who 
constitute the association. But of course this is not the case: the contracts are between 
contributors of labor and capital and the corporation itself.   
1. The Role of the State 
The nexus of contracts approach to corporate law is a powerful conceptual tool.  
On this model, entrepreneurs hire managers to administer the affairs of the 
corporation.  But, of course, the corporation cannot operate without labor and capital, 
and in order to attract these inputs, the corporation must make attractive binding 
contractual promises to induce suppliers of capital to agree to contribute their human 
or monetary capital to the business.  The more credible the promise that a corporation 
is able to make, the better terms the corporation will obtain from investors of all sorts.   
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The state plays a disquietingly limited role in the nexus of contracts theory, 
because the leading theorists slight as mundane that which is necessary.  There is no 
“entirely satisfactory” answer to the question of why the state’s involvement in 
general or corporate law in particular is required or what role the state or corporate 
law play in the nexus of contract theory.36  According to the nexus of contracts theory, 
the state’s role is to fill in blanks in the inevitably incomplete contracts that 
contributors of labor and capital forge with the corporation.  As Frank Easterbrook 
and Dan Fischel have observed: 
corporate law is a set of terms available off the-rack so that 
participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of 
contracting.  There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting, 
establishing quorums, and so on, that almost everyone will 
want to adopt.  Corporate codes and existing judicial 
decisions supply these terms “for free” to every corporation, 
enabling the venturers to concentrate on matters that are 
specific to their undertaking. . . . Corporate law—and in 
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in 
the blanks and oversights with the terms that people would 
have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and 
been able to transact costlessly in advance.  On this view 
corporate law supplements but never displaces actual 
bargains—save in situations of third-party effects or 
latecomer terms.37 
 
This simple and elegant portrayal of the role of the corporation is incomplete 
because it ignores that the key role for corporate law—and for the state—is creating 
                                                 
36 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1416, 
1444 (1989). 
37 Id. at 1444-45. 
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the legal infrastructure that allows for the existence of the corporation and its 
endowment with legal rights and duties.  The nexus of contracts view of the 
corporation simply assumes the existence of the corporation.  But corporations do not 
exist by any organic or natural process.  Although corporations are legal entities, they 
are not carbon-based life forms that have evolved into sentient creatures.  You and 
your teammates cannot call “limited liability entity” on the state of nature’s business 
playground: It takes the law to set the rules under which you may do so. 
The existence of the corporation can only be attributed to the state.  Still more 
recently, scholars studying the theory of legal entities, particularly Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier Kraakman, have shown that the state is essential in providing the 
corporation with distinct property rights in general and, in particular, a discrete, 
“portioned” pool of assets that are shielded from the shareholders’ personal 
creditors.38 
No one can form a corporation without the acquiescence of the state, which 
creates the framework by which corporations can be created.  The process involves 
filing a certificate of incorporation.  But before this can happen, the state has to pass 
                                                 
38 See Henry Hansmann and Reinier H. Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387 (2000); Henry Hansmann and Reinier H. Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset 
Partitioning, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 807 (2000); Henry Hansmann and Reinier H. Kraakman, 
Property, Contract and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of 
Rights,” 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373 (2002); Henry Hansmann, Reinier H. Kraakman and Richard 
Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2006); see also Jensen & Meckling, 
supra note 34, at 310 (“[M]ost organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for 
a set of contracting relationships among individuals.”). 
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an enabling statute that permits the corporation to be formed in the first place.  For 
example, under Delaware law, the relevant statute provides that:  
[a]ny person, partnership, association or corporation, singly or jointly 
with others, and without regard to such person’s or entity’s residence, 
domicile or state of incorporation, may incorporate or organize a 
corporation under this chapter by filing with the Division of 
Corporations in the Department of State a certificate of incorporation.39 
 
Corporations can be formed only after the state creates this legal framework. 
And, under this legal framework, corporations are legal entities that have legal 
personhood in the sense that they can enter into contracts, sue and be sued, pay taxes, 
and generally shoulder legal responsibility in their own names, without 
simultaneously obligating any of their constituents, including their stockholders. 
2. All Firms, Not Just Corporations Are Nexuses of Contracts 
As a matter of empirical, inarguable fact, corporations are creatures of the state.  
It is not realistic or accurate to assume that corporations somehow exist without the 
benefit of enabling action by the state and that people can contract with them.  Thus, 
the state plays a larger conceptual role in the life of the corporation than the nexus of 
contract theoreticians recognize.  It is only after the state has both: (1) permitted the 
formation of the corporation in the first place; and (2) recognized it as a legal entity 
that the contracting process can begin. 
                                                 
39 8 Del. C. § 101(a). 
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As important, the nexus of contracts theory is not a theory of corporations in 
particular, but rather a general theory of business organizations.  It therefore does not 
even speak to what corporations specifically are as a matter of law.  The nexus of 
contracts theory applies with equal force to all forms of business organization, 
including partnerships and limited liability companies, and even sole proprietorships.   
Notably, some of these forms of business organization require state intervention 
for formation and others do not.  Those forms of business organization that do not 
require state intervention can be plausibly viewed as “associations of individuals,” but 
those forms of business organization that do require intervention and can only be 
created under the authority of a state statute are fundamentally different.  These state 
statutes grant individual entrepreneurs the right to create new legal entities that are 
categorically distinct from their investors and from their creators.   
Without an enabling state statute, a corporation cannot be formed.  These 
statutes operate to give corporations their central defining characteristic, which is their 
status as distinct legal entities.  By contrast, general partnerships and sole 
proprietorships, which, unlike corporations are associations of individuals, cannot 
claim the attributes of “corporateness” that legally emanate from corporations’ status 
as distinct legal entities.   
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3. The Separation of Ownership and Control 
Before the modern conception of the corporation as a nexus of contracts, the 
most innovative theoretical perspective on corporations was based in the emergence 
of corporations that had grown large, and whose dispersed stockholders were seen as 
unable to constrain the managers, directors, and officers who ran corporate affairs.  In 
their classic work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means 
identified this growing reality and its consequence, a phenomenon they called the 
“separation of ownership and control.”40  This phrase captured the notion that 
shareholders, who were characterized as the “owners” of the corporation, were 
generally passive investors who ceded ownership of the business to professional 
managers who “control” the corporation in ways that often served only their own 
private interests and caused mischief for shareholders and society.   
The conception of the corporation as characterized by a separation of ownership 
and control is undeniable as a descriptive matter, but somewhat controversial from a 
normative perspective.  Berle and Means and their adherents took the view that the 
separation of share ownership and managerial control raised profound challenges that 
justified imposing limitations on the scope of business corporations’ powers and 
                                                 
40 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1932). 
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activities.  One characterization of the legal implications of the Berle and Means view 
of the corporation was articulated by Justice Brandeis as follows: 
Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld is always 
a matter of state policy.  If granted, the privilege is conferred in order 
to achieve an end which the State deems desirable.  It may be granted 
as a means of raising revenue; or in order to procure for the community 
a public utility, a bank or a desired industry not otherwise obtainable; 
or the reason for granting it may be to promote more generally the 
public welfare by providing an instrumentality of business which will 
facilitate the establishment and conduct of new and large enterprises 
deemed of public benefit.  Similarly, if the privilege is denied, it is 
denied because incidents of like corporate enterprise are deemed 
inimical to the public welfare and it is desired to protect the community 
from apprehended harm.41 
 
Although the concept of the separation of ownership and control is merely 
descriptive, at some point, the term “separation of ownership and control” and the 
phrase “Berle and Means corporation” came to stand for the proposition that 
corporations posed big problems for society.  Eventually, scholars more narrowly 
focused on the interests of stockholders arose to respond to the normative implications 
raised by those who described the corporation as characterized by a separation of 
ownership and control.42  Significantly, scholars associated with the law and 
economics movement accepted the descriptive fact that the corporation can be 
characterized as a separation of functions akin to the separation of ownership and 
                                                 
41 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
42 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. 
& ECON. 30l (1983). 
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control.  But these scholars described the ownership function of shareholders in 
economic terms as being characterized by their role as risk-bearers and residual 
claimants.43   
On the law and economics revisionist view of the separation of ownership and 
control conception of the corporation, the shareholders invested their money, and 
therefore assumed some of the risks associated with the failure of the firm and, on the 
flip side, were entitled to the excess cash flows from the earnings of the firm once 
suitable provision had been made for the prior claims of creditors.  Although the 
shareholder “owners” assumed this risk-bearing function, the control function was 
carried out by professional managers who had developed a specialized set of skills, 
known as human capital that enabled them to excel at management and decision-
making.  On this view, professional managers were compensated for these 
management and decision-making skills, which shareholders did not possess.  Thus, 
the law and economics movement transformed the Berle-Means separation of 
ownership and control, with its negative connotations, into a slightly different 
conception of the corporation as being characterized by a “separation of decision 
(management) and risk-bearing (ownership) functions” that exists in part “because of 
the benefits of specialization of management and risk bearing” but also “because of 
                                                 
43 See e.g., id. at 302–03 (describing agents “who contract for the rights to net cash flows” as 
“residual claimants or residual risk bearers”). 
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an effective common approach to controlling the agency problems caused by 
separation of decision and risk-bearing.”44 
The key difference between the Berle-Means “separation of ownership and 
control” view of the corporation and the law and economics “separation of decision-
making and risk-bearing” view of the corporation is about how wide a lens from which 
to view the dangers of the separation of ownership and control.  Berle himself viewed 
these dangers as involving more than stockholders, and thus he and others like him 
worked to strengthen external constraints on corporate managers in a way that reduced 
their ability to abuse their power.45  Berle, for example, was a key author of the New 
Deal,46 many of the provisions of which had the effect of creating external regulation 
that limited the extent to which corporate managers could use corporate power to 
                                                 
44 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 
30l, 301‒302 (1983); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 34.  Although Jensen and Meckling’s work 
is considered innovative, it must be remembered that their economic gloss was not novel.  The 
governance of corporations in the United States resembles real polities for a good reason.  
Corporate statute writers grappled with the same concerns that animated Locke, Montesquieu, and 
the Founders of our Republic: How could we create structures under which the governed benefit 
from centralized managements?  How do we balance effective governance with accountability to 
the interest holders?  Corporate law thus uses a combination of tools of republican democracy 
(e.g., elections of directors) and direct democracy (e.g., the right to vote on certain essential items 
such as charter (i.e., constitutional changes) or mergers).  Jensen and Meckling is considered 
brilliant law and economics, but in many ways is a restatement of principles elementary to any 
student of our constitutional history. 
45 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24 BUS. LAW. 149, 152 
(1968) (“The corporate system of our time . . . can and should conform to social requirements; it 
can and should lend help to government and to quasi-public and other institutions whose task is to 
develop a society both good and just.”). 
46 See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Reshaping the American Economy, 9 CENTENNIAL REV. 209 
(1965).   
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harm, not just investors,47 but workers,48 and consumers, and society generally.  By 
the time more stockholder-focused law and economics scholars began theorizing, they 
accepted as a foundational fact that external law, exemplified by the New Deal, 
existed to protect other corporate constituents.49  They therefore focused on the 
implications of the separation of ownership and control, and the limited rights of 
stockholders.50  Why would investors entrust their capital to corporations over which 
they only had limited influence?51   
                                                 
47 For example, the New Deal created a system of securities regulation to deter fraud and self-
dealing.  See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77a et seq.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.   
48 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 151–69; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (establishing the right to 
a minimum wage).   
49 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 51 (“[P]olitical mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the 
appropriate way to determine the allocation of scare resources to alternative uses.”); Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL’Y 303, 310 (1973); STEPHEN 
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 429 (2002) (taking this view and noting that 
“the federal government has intervened” to protect workers, such as through Family and Medical 
Leave Act provisions requiring unpaid leave for family and medical problems, Occupational 
Health and Safety Administration regulations requiring safe working conditions, and civil rights 
laws prohibiting discrimination).  See also Leo E. Strine & Nicholas Walter, Conservative 
Collision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens 
United, 100 CORNELL. L. REV. 335, 352–54 (2015) (documenting the view among conservative 
corporate law theorists that business should focus on profits because political processes protect 
other interests). 
50 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 34; Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case] (proposing 
increased shareholder power based on an efficiency rationale). 
51 Law and economics scholars have been concerned about the relative weakness of stockholders 
in comparison to corporate managers because they normatively believe that business corporations 
generate the most societal value by focusing on making profits for their investors in a lawful 
manner.  See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33; Arrow, supra note 49, at 132; Michael C. Jensen, 
Value Maximisation, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 7 EUR. FIN. 
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On either the broader or narrower view, however, there is a clear and sharp line 
of demarcation between managers who control and make decisions for the corporation 
and the shareholders who allocate risk capital to the corporation in the hope of a return 
on their investment.  This notion of the corporation appears to be understood at least 
partially by the justices in Citizens United.  Justice Scalia, in concurrence, addresses 
the dissent’s argument that “‘speech’ refers to oral communications of human beings, 
and since corporations are not human beings they cannot speak.”52 Scalia’s response 
is that corporations speak through agents: “The authorized spokesman of a corporation 
is a human being, who speaks on behalf of the human beings who have formed that 
association—just as the spokesman of an unincorporated association speaks on behalf 
of its members.”53 
This treatment of the corporation is logically and factually flawed.  The fact 
that an inanimate object such as a corporation has a human spokesman does not 
                                                 
MGMT. 297, 302 (2011); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 15–22 (1991).  They share with other scholars the premise that 
the corporation is in fact distinct from its stockholders and that those stockholders only have 
limited rights to constrain corporate action.  Scholars who believe business corporations should be 
obliged to act with equal regard toward all their constituents, and not put profit over social 
responsibility, embrace the weakness of stockholders and the distinct nature of the corporation as 
an entity for another reason.  They view the fact that the corporation is not an association of 
stockholders as the key “attribute” not “deficiency” of corporate law, because it allows for business 
corporations that conduct their affairs in a socially responsible manner.  See COLIN MAYER, 
PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 38 (2018).  For that reason, they fear 
that developments that make corporate managers more subject to stockholder direct influence are 
dangerous.  Id.  See generally LYNN STOUT, SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012).   
52 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 392 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
53 Id. 
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somehow transform the inanimate object into an animate object.  After all, a person 
who takes her cat to the veterinarian is speaking on behalf of the cat, but doing so does 
not transform the cat into a person.  In other words, the fact that a corporation can only 
speak through agents undermines rather than supports the claim in Citizens United 
that a corporation is an association of individuals.   
Moreover, in the face of the ubiquitous and pervasive agency costs that 
inevitably come with the separation of management and risk-bearing, there is never 
any assurance that those who purport to speak on behalf of investors are truly doing 
so.54  This point appears particularly strong in light of the fact that shareholders are 
not a monolithic group.  Shareholders may all agree that they would prefer that the 
value of their shares increase in value rather than decrease in value, but the notion of 
shareholder homogeneity goes no further than this.  Shareholders are as heterogeneous 
as society as a whole, and the notion that a corporate spokesperson can “represent” 
the shareholders in a non-commercial realm such as speech is farcical.  As Ronald 
Gilson and Michael Klausner have observed: 
Under existing corporate law stockholders’ ability to influence how 
management runs a corporation’s business is largely limited to annually 
electing a board of directors.  Stockholders’ interests are supposed to 
be solely financial: Management maximizes the return on stockholders’ 
investment and stockholders pass judgment on management 
performance when they elect directors.  When stockholders share this 
                                                 
54 John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United, 
9 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 657, 667 (2012). 
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common concern with profits a simple governance system serves them 
and the economy well.   
 
But stockholders do not have a common interest in political activity.  
They may be Republicans or Democrats, pro-choice or pro-life, for or 
against the Senate’s health care bill.  A stockholder of a pharmaceutical 
company, for example, could oppose a politician who promises to favor 
the pharmaceutical industry because of the politician’s views on 
financial sector reform.55 
 
Significantly, in our view, both of the economic approaches to the corporation, 
the nexus of contracts approach and the separation of risk-bearing (“ownership”) and 
management (“control”) reflect the fact that a defining feature of the corporation is 
the sharp distinction between the active strategic and tactical functions of management 
and the passive investment and risk-bearing functions of the shareholders.  These 
competing conceptions of the corporation reflect a consensus among economists of 
all ideological stripes that corporate managers often do not speak for shareholders, but 
instead speak for themselves.56 
                                                 
55 Ronald Gilson and Michael Klausner, That’s My Money You’re Using, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2010), 
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0329/opinions-citizens-united-corporate-shareholders-on-
my-mind.html#21f6fb0b586c; see also Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law 
Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 961 (1984) (pursuit of goals other than profit maximization as 
“especially disturbing because profit maximization is the only goal for which we can at least 
theoretically posit shareholder unanimity”); Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesny, Why They Give 
at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1224 (“[S]hareholders may have very different views on 
what is good for society.”).  See generally Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra 
note 49, at 364–65 (gathering authorities for this proposition).  
56 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 34 (presenting a model in which managers act in ways 
that serve their own interests at stockholders’ expense); Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate 
Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1191, 1200–02 (2002) (raising concerns about agency costs 
in corporate charitable giving); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political 
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Moreover, the very concept that corporate managers speak for shareholders 
obscures the fact that shareholders are by no means monolithic in their views about 
politics.  In fact, the heterogeneity of shareholders is such that it is inevitable that 
corporations who purport to speak on behalf of their shareholders are speaking only 
on behalf of a subset of such shareholders.  Further, both of the economic views of the 
corporation are based on the assumption that a corporation is a separate entity distinct 
from its shareholders.   
 This shared belief is also based on another stubborn legal fact that Citizens 
United’s associational theory fails to acknowledge.  Stockholders do not get to 
choose the message and send out a human corporate spokesperson to deliver it on 
their associated behalf.  That is not how corporate law works.  Except as to limited 
issues on which they have a direct vote,57 stockholders only vote for directors.  Under 
a majority of states’ corporate laws, directors are not required to give stockholders’ 
interests primary weight, they are entitled to consider the interests of other corporate 
                                                 
Speech: Who Decides?, 123 HARV. L. REV. 83, 90–93 (2010) (“[T]here is no reason to expect that 
the preferences of the particular individuals who make the company’s political speech decisions 
will match those of shareholders” because shareholders usually “do not sort themselves among 
companies according to their political preferences”). There is also  empirical literature on the 
potential for agency costs in corporate charitable giving and political donations.  See, e.g., Ronald 
W. Masulis, Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 592 (2015); Hao 
Liang & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Donations & Shareholder Value, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. 
Finance Working Paper No. 491/2016, at 22–23, 25–26 (2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2885936. 
57 See 5 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2097, Westlaw (last updated 
Sept. 2017) (“[T]he powers of management vesting in the shareholders as a body are very 
few . . . .”). 
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constituencies.58  In speaking for the corporation, therefore, it is the board that sets 
corporate policy and that policy is not one that must be based on what the 
stockholders view as the correct perspective.  And, even in states like Delaware with 
a strong focus on stockholders, the directors, not stockholders, determine policy, and 
they do not have a duty to satisfy momentary stockholder demands.59  Stockholders 
have limited influence and have to throw the bums out to change policy, a difficult 
and expensive proposition.60  Shareholders’ traditional power relative to managers 
is captured by the title of Professor Roe’s book: Strong Managers, Weak Owners: 
The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance.61  Stated simply, it is precisely 
because corporations are distinct from, and cannot be relationally considered as an 
association of any of them, that theorists like Berle,62 Friedman,63 Easterbrook and 
Fischel,64 and Bebchuk65 have spent so much time considering how to constrain the 
                                                 
58 See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 
1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 85; Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can 
Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 
LOYOLA L. REV. 765, 768 n.13 (2009). 
59 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to 
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1762–64 (2006).     
60 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 688–94 
(2007) (documenting the costs and hurdles to running a proxy contest). For a classic work 
examining shareholder access to the proxy machinery, see Melvin Eisenberg, Access to the Proxy 
Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970).  
61 MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1996). 
62 See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 40. 
63 See generally Friedman, supra note 51. 
64 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). 
65 See generally Bebchuk, The Case, supra note 50. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118 
36 
 
power of corporate management to ensure that corporations further, rather than 
erode, public welfare as they diversely view it. 
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II. The Core Attributes of Separate Legal Entities 
The preceding section of this Article details how economists understand the 
corporation not as an “association of individuals” but as a distinct legal entity separate 
from its shareholders.  In this section, we examine Citizens United’s assertion that the 
corporation is an association of individuals from a legal perspective.  The core of our 
argument is that there are forms of business organization that are associations of 
individuals, but that the corporation is not one of them.  Indeed, we show that the 
entire point of the corporate form is to allow for the creation of organizations that are 
distinct from their shareholders. Thus, not only is the notion that corporations are 
associations of individuals misguided and inconsistent with corporate law’s 
conception of the corporation, it is antithetical to the state law conception of the 
corporation.  If the corporation were merely an “association of individuals,” rather 
than an actual legal entity in its own right, the justification for immunizing 
shareholders from liability for corporate debts would disappear.  After all, if corporate 
speech is shareholder speech, then by parity of reasoning, corporate debts are 
shareholder debts.    
For thousands of years, human commerce took the form of sole proprietors 
bartering goods and services.66  Over time, the dominant form of business 
                                                 
66 See JONATHAN MACEY, DOUGLAS MOLL & ROBERT HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 1 
(13th Ed. 2017). 
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organization became the partnership.67  Under state law, partnerships are associations 
of “two or more persons” who organize to carry on as co-owners “a business for 
profit.”68  As a consequence of their status as associations of persons, partners are 
agents of the partnership and are jointly and severally liable for the debts of the 
partnership.  Unlike corporations, partnerships truly are associations of individuals.  
Simply put, the organizational form that the Court describes in Citizens United is a 
general partnership, not a corporation.   
In the west, the idea of the corporation began with the Romans.  Indeed, Roman 
law introduced the very idea that “organizations could be legal entities in their own 
right with a legal personality that was distinct from the individual who comprised 
them.”69  The very term “corporation” derives from the Latin word corpus which 
translates into English as the word “body,” which presents an entity that is authorized 
by the state to act as an individual.  Initially, cities were organized by the Romans as 
corporations. Gradually the concept was extended to certain community organizations 
called “collegia” that served community groups or religious societies.  There is some 
evidence that an early form of business organization called the “publicani,” which was 
organized to build aqueducts, manufacture arms, construct temples, collect taxes, and 
perform certain governmental functions, received a corporate status (habere corpus) 
                                                 
67 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 130 (3d Ed. 2005). 
68 Unif. Partnership Act § 102(10); Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 202(a). 
69 MAYER, supra note 51, at 65.   
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that included a grant of limited liability for investors as early as the third century.  
Although this feature did not persist over time, it reemerged in the early 19th century 
in the U.S. and England.70  As both a matter of law and of history, because partnerships 
were associations of individuals, individual investors could control their investment 
by their right to withdraw their investments at will.71   
As recent important work by Dari-Mattiacci, Gelderblom, Jonker, and Perotti 
has shown, this ability easily to withdraw capital subjected partnerships to runs by 
investors and made the organizations unsuitable for carrying out long-term strategies 
or for raising debt:72    
Traditional Roman partnership law adhered strictly to the 
principle of exit at will, which gave each individual 
partner the right to force the liquidation of the partnership.  
This principle prevented parties from credibly agreeing to 
remain in a partnership for the long term: lock-in contracts 
were not fully enforceable in court.  Overcoming this 
limitation required a legal innovation, not merely a 
contractual one.  Only the law could grant capital 
permanence to private corporations, extending a privilege 
until then enjoyed by public corporations such as 
townships, monasteries, and hospitals.73 
 
                                                 
70 RONALD COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 31‒32 (2014).   
See also Ulrike Malmendier, Law and Finance at the Origin, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 1076, 1076‒1108 
(2009); WILLIAM BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN 
LAW 282‒288 (2004).   
71 Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost Jonker, & Enrico C. Perotti, The Emergence 
of the Corporate Form, J. L. ECON. & ORG. 193, 195 (2017). 
72 Id. at 195.   
73 Id. 
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 The problem outlined by Dari-Mattiacci, Gelderblom, Jonker and Perotti 
persists in modern times.  Take for example a 1985 case concerning a general 
partnership consisting of three partners, Thomas Bernabei, James Serra, and Howard 
Wenger.74  As is typically the case in partnerships, each of these individuals 
contributed capital to the partnership and shared in the partnership’s profits and losses.  
Sometime after the partnership purchased a title insurance policy, two of the partners, 
Bernabei and Serra, sold and transferred their partnership interests to the third partner 
Wenger and to a new partner, one James Valentine.  When the partnership attempted 
to collect on the title insurance policy, the insurance company rejected the claim on 
the grounds that when Bernabei and Serra left the partnership and Valentine joined 
the partnership, the old partnership was dissolved and a new partnership was formed.  
The insurance company argued that the insurance policy was with the defunct former 
business entity not with the latter business entity, which automatically formed when 
the old partnership was dissolved following the withdrawal of the two partners.  The 
court agreed, observing that the common law rule that a dissolution occurs and a new 
partnership is formed whenever a partner retires or a new partner is admitted was still 
in place after the enactment by the state of Ohio of the Uniform Partnership Act, which 
reflects the “aggregate theory of partnership.”75  As such, the original partnership was 
                                                 
74 Fairway Development Co. v. Title Insurance of Minnesota, 621 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ohio 1985). 
75 Id. at 122. 
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the party to the insurance contract and the new partnership was not, and the new 
partnership had “no standing to sue the defendant” for breach of contract.76  For 
hundreds of years, the tactic used by business people for avoiding the results like this 
is to form a corporation, which is a separate and distinct legal entity capable of 
contracting in its own name and of surviving the withdrawal of partners or the passing 
of partnership interests.   
The point here is simple: the state intervened to permit the formation of the 
corporation, a form of business organization that was specifically designed to be a 
legal entity separate and distinct from its investors.  Corporations are legal entities and 
not associations of individuals because if they were associations of individuals, they 
would not be able to raise equity or to attract lenders or to operate with any sort of 
regularity or stability.   
The remainder of this Section explores the implications of the entity theory and 
demonstrates that the organizational form known as the corporation must be 
considered an entity and cannot be considered an association of individuals.  In 
contrast, the partnership is an association of individuals or an “aggregate of the 
individual partners with no legal differentiation between the business and the partners 
themselves.”77 
                                                 
76 Id. at 123‒25. 
77 MACEY, MOLL & HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 4. 
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As we show, all of the fundamental characteristics of the corporation are 
consistent with the separate legal entity conception of the corporation and inconsistent 
with the association of individuals conception of the corporation to which the majority 
in Citizens United subscribed.   
A. Limited Liability and Piercing the Corporate Veil 
Perhaps the greatest logical flaw in the conception of the corporate form 
embraced by the majority in Citizens United is its implications for the concept of 
limited liability.  If the corporation were in fact an association of individuals rather 
than a discrete legal entity in its own right, then, just as the shareholders would enjoy 
free speech rights, so too would they be legally responsible for the debts of the entity 
because limited liability is a consequence of the entity theory of the corporation and 
the law’s rejection of the associational theory of the corporation.   
The relationship between the Supreme Court’s notion that corporations are 
associations of individuals and the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was clearly 
articulated by Adam Winkler in his book We the Corporations: How American 
Businesses Won Their Civil Rights.78  As Winkler observes, treating the corporation 
as an association of citizens collapses the distinction between the corporation and its 
                                                 
78 ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL 
RIGHTS (2018).   
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members, “suggesting the courts see right through the corporation and focus instead 
on the people who compose it.”79  Winkler further observes that: 
Corporate lawyers have a name for this way of thinking about 
corporations.  They call it “piercing the corporate veil.” The ordinary 
rule, ever since the days of Blackstone, is that there is a strict separation 
between the corporation and the people behind it.  That is why the 
corporation, not the stockholders, is liable if someone is injured using 
the company’s products.  In a small number of highly unusual cases, 
however, the courts will pierce the corporate veil, ignoring the separate 
legal status of the corporation and imposing liability on shareholders 
personally.80 
 
Professor Winkler’s notion that treating the corporation as an association of 
citizens is the equivalent of piercing the corporate veil is inaccurate.81  The doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil presupposes that a corporation is a “juridical entity with 
the characteristic of legal ‘personhood.’”82  The legal recognition that corporations are 
distinct legal entities that are not associations of shareholders is reflected in the fact 
that courts recognize that it is legitimate to create a corporation or other form of 
limited liability business organization such as a limited liability company “for the very 
purpose of escaping personal liability” for the debts incurred by the enterprise.83  And 
                                                 
79 Id. at 54‒55. 
80 Id. 
81 Joshua Macey, Reevaluating Veil Piercing, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (reviewing ADAM 
WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 
(2018)).   
82 Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, The Three Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 99, 100 (2014). 
83 Bartle v. Home Owners Co-op, 127 N.E. 2d 832, 833 (N.Y. 1955). 
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it is precisely because corporations have legal status as juridical entities with the 
characteristic of legal personhood that courts’ equitable authority to pierce the 
corporate veil is to be exercised “reluctantly” and “cautiously.” 84 
Rather than viewing Citizens United as a case that pierces the corporate veil, it 
would be more accurate to view the decision as reflecting a view that there is no 
corporate veil in the first place.  Viewing the corporation as an association of 
shareholders eliminates the separation between the corporation and its shareholders.85  
Although piercing the corporate veil is “limited to rare cases involving fraud and 
abuse,”86 viewing the corporation as an “association of shareholders” is not a legal 
remedy, rather it reflects an existential view of the corporation.87   
Piercing the corporate veil is a legal remedy that rectifies some wrong 
perpetrated by shareholders through their improper use of the corporate form.88  The 
wrongdoing by shareholders that leads to piercing may take the form of 
undercapitalizing the corporation, failing to observe corporate formalities,  
committing fraud, paying illegal dividends, or making other prohibited distributions 
                                                 
84 Dewitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1976). 
85 Joshua Macey, supra note 81. 
86 ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL 
RIGHTS 67‒68 (2018). 
87 Joshua Macey, supra note 81. 
88 See Crosse v. BCBSD, Inc., 836 A.2d 492, 497 (Del. 2003) (“To state a ‘veil-piercing claim,’ 
the plaintiff must plead facts supporting an inference that the corporation, through its alter-ego, 
has created a sham entity designed to defraud investors and creditors.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118 
45 
 
on the eve of bankruptcy.89  In sharp contrast, conceptualizing the corporation as an 
association of shareholders does not require any wrongdoing by shareholders.  In fact, 
it does not require any action by shareholders at all.  Indeed, conceptualizing the 
corporation as an association of shareholders, as was done in Citizens United, does 
not require that any shareholder even be aware that the corporation is doing anything.  
Thus, it is inaccurate to equate the treatment of the corporation as an association of 
individuals with the corporate law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.   
More generally, the limited remedies of other constituencies against 
stockholders also undercut the associational model.  Consistent with the counterparty 
argument, when workers and debtholders do not have their promises honored, they 
generally have to rely upon the entity, not stockholders, for relief.  Piercing the veil is 
one example of how difficult it is to clawback against equity,90 but so too are 
fraudulent conveyance laws, which are not easy to use.91  This illustrates another point 
about using models as a way of examining how corporations work and why they 
should function in certain ways, as opposed to objective law.  Under arguments about 
residual claimants, the simplifying assumption is that legal claimants get paid first.  
But of course, that assumption, which assumes no pie gets eaten until a final feast, is 
                                                 
89 Macey & Mitts, supra note 82. 
90 See generally id. 
91 See generally GLENDA K. HARNAD & SONJA LARSEN, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE § 6, Westlaw 
(last updated Aug. 2018).  
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wrong.  All the time there are transfers to equity, and if down the line, those transfers 
do not leave enough to feed the others, the others generally have to look just to the 
entity, not the stockholders, to be made whole.  This is because the entity is by law a 
unique person, not an association of its stockholders. 
B. Not So Special:  Stockholders Are At Most Fellow Contract Claimants, 
Not Corporate Owners  
As significantly, shareholders are not owners of the corporations in which they 
own shares.  Rather, they are merely owners of investment contracts that give them 
certain contractual claims on the cash flows generated by the corporation.  As a matter 
of logic, the corporation is a legal person, and it does not have owners any more than 
natural persons have owners.  The notion that shareholders own the corporations in 
which they have invested is a myth.92  The fact of the matter is that shareholders’ 
rights sound in contract not in property.  Shareholders have contractual rights to vote 
for directors, though voting rights may be skewed by contract so as effectively to 
deprive the majority of shareholders of the right to vote.  Shareholders have no right 
to enter corporate property or to command that corporate resources be allocated or not 
allocated in any particular way.  Even shareholders’ rights to the cash flows generated 
by the firm are highly ephemeral.  Shareholders are entitled to dividends if and when 
                                                 
92 John Kay, Shareholders Think They Own the Company: They are Wrong, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 10, 
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/7bd1b20a-879b-11e5-90de-f44762bf9896; Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
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the corporation’s boards of directors exercise their virtually unfettered discretion to 
declare a dividend.   
Certainly conceptions of property have moved beyond the strict view often 
attributed to Blackstone that defined property as “that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”93  But even under the 
more modern view that property rights are not absolute, those claiming a property 
interest in something must have a claim of dominion and control more substantial than 
do shareholders.  Certain legal realists and their intellectual heirs have defined 
ownership rights as consisting of a “bundle of rights.”94  But even under this expansive 
view of property rights,95 the meager bundle accorded to shareholders, which does not 
include any rights to enter, much less to possess property or to allocate property in 
                                                 
93 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.  Blackstone’s own view was more nuanced.  
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 13 (1985) (“Blackstone’s sweeping definition . . . overstated the case; indeed, he 
devoted the succeeding 518 pages of book 2 of his Commentaries . . . to qualifying and specifying 
the exceptions to his definition.”). 
94 A.M. Honore, Ownership, in Oxford Essays In Jurisprudence 107, 113 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961); 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 21-24 (1913); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO 
PROPERTY 2-3 (2d ed. 2005). 
95 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?,111 YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001) (“[T]he motivation behind the realists’ fascination 
with the bundle-of-rights conception was mainly political. They sought to undermine the notion 
that property is a natural right, and thereby smooth the way for activist state intervention in 
regulating and redistributing property.  If property has no fixed core of meaning, but is just a 
variable collection of interests established by social convention, then there is no good reason why 
the state should not freely expand or, better yet, contract the list of interests in the name of the 
general welfare.”).   
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any way, is not sufficiently broad to sustain an assertion that shareholders somehow 
are owners.  Clearly they are not. 
Shareholders, for example, have no ability, even collectively, to determine 
executive compensation.  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 was thought to expand shareholder rights considerably because 
it contained a provision requiring that shareholders be allowed to cast a purely 
precatory, advisory vote on executive compensation at least once every three years.  
These votes, colloquially called “say-on-pay” ballots, are non-binding and do not 
create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties governing corporate directors’ 
conduct under applicable state laws.  
Recognizing shareholders for what they are, which is mere contractual counter-
parties with the firms in which they have invested, undermines the romantic notion 
that corporations are associations of shareholders.  For example, one would imagine 
that if shareholders were in fact members of an association of shareholders in the 
companies in which they have invested, then they would be permitted at the very least 
to communicate with one another in a free and unfettered way.  But this is not the 
case.  Shareholder communication with other shareholders, while possible, is strictly 
regulated, and it appears that the Securities and Exchange Commission has virtually 
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unfettered rights to regulate corporate communications.96  Thus, the notion that 
corporations are “associations of shareholders” is further undermined by the fact that 
shareholders lack even the most basic associational rights. 
III. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Corporate Entity in Other 
Areas of Law 
In this section we demonstrate that treating the corporation as an association of 
individuals is a radical, existential assertion about the nature of the corporation, and 
one that is counter-factual and at odds with the foundational principles of American 
corporate law.  The following sections demonstrate the spuriousness of treating 
corporations as associations of individuals by showing how they interact with several 
core doctrines of corporate law and federal jurisdiction. 
Put even more starkly, we show that in almost every other area of jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court has accepted the conception of the corporation that we advance in 
this article.  To wit, the Supreme Court generally accepts the conception of 
corporations as being established by the state laws which create them.  In deciding 
cases before it, the Supreme Court does not theorize about associations of 
stockholders or nexuses of contracts, it accepts the perhaps mundane, but profoundly 
important and true, fact that legal reality drives corporate reality.  That is, in other 
                                                 
96 Ronald Gilson, Lilli Gordon & John Pound, How the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive 
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contexts, as distinguished commentators have also noted,97 the Supreme Court hews 
to the view of the corporation that we have argued is required by the state laws that 
establish business corporations in our nation. 
A. The Basics:  A Corporation Cannot Proceed Pro Se Through a 
Stockholder or Officer  
An early and seemingly mundane, but important, example, deals with whether 
a corporation, like a human being, may represent itself in court “pro se.”  Because a 
corporation is not identifiable with any of its human constituents, be they stockholders 
or managers, the Supreme Court in an early case and consistent with English law on 
the point, recognized that “a corporation, it is true, can appear only by attorney, while 
a natural person may appear for himself.”98 
In other areas dealing with standing, the Supreme Court has refused to allow 
stockholders to ignore the corporate form.  When the sole stockholder of a small 
corporation tried to sue Domino’s Pizza for refusing to contract with his corporation, 
allegedly because he was black, the Supreme Court found against him stating: 
It is fundamental corporation and agency law—indeed it can be said to 
be the whole purpose of corporation and agency law—that the 
shareholders and contracting officer of a corporation has no rights and is 
exposed to no liability under the corporation’s contracts.99 
 
                                                 
97 See Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 
333889; Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The Business Entity Response to 
Challenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
98 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 830 (1824).  
99 Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 477 (1986).   
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Or as the Supreme Court said in a case dealing with a parent corporation 
attempting to complain about the Interstate Commerce Commission’s denial of permit 
for its subsidiary, “[o]ne who has created a corporate arrangement, chosen as a means 
of carrying out his business purpose, does not have the choice of disregarding the 
corporate entity in order to avoid the obligations which the statute lays upon it for the 
protection of the public.”100  
B. Diversity Jurisdiction  
Treating the corporation as an association of shareholders is inconsistent with 
the well understood legal rule that corporations are separate juridical entities in their 
own right for purposes of establishing jurisdiction for federal courts on the grounds of 
diversity of citizenship.   Federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 affords 
jurisdiction to federal courts in disputes that involve more than $75,000 and in which 
there is “complete diversity,” which means that no defendant can be a citizen of any 
state of which a plaintiff is a citizen.  
It is hard to imagine a clearer statement of the proposition that corporations are 
not “associations of shareholders” than 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), the federal diversity 
jurisdiction statute, which provides that “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen 
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of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its 
principal place of business.”101  
In Hertz Corp. v. Friend,102 lawyers brought a class action suit against Hertz in 
a California state court on behalf of certain residents of California.  Hertz moved to 
remove the case to a California federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction.  
The plaintiffs argued that there was no diversity jurisdiction as Hertz’s principal place 
of business was California and not Florida.  The federal district court agreed and 
remanded the case to the state court.103  On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court holding that the district court correctly 
applied the “place of operations test” and concluded that Hertz’s principal place of 
business was California and consequently diversity jurisdiction did not exist and the 
case could not be brought in federal court.104  The Supreme Court in Hertz held that 
the phrase principal place of business in § 1332(c)(1) “refers to the place where the 
corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 
activities,” or its “nerve center,” which “will typically be found at [its] 
headquarters.”105  Business organizations that are viewed as associations of their 
investors, including partnerships, limited partnerships, and LLCs have been 
                                                 
101 28 U.S.C. §1332(c)(1). 
102 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
103 Friend v. Hertz Corp., 2008 WL 7071465, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008). 
104 Friend v. Hertz Corp., 297 Fed. Appx. 690, 691 (9th Cir. 2008). 
105 Hertz, 559 U.S. at 80. 
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determined by courts to be citizens of the states in which the organization’s partners 
or members are citizens.106  Thus, the Court’s decision in Hertz v. Friend and indeed 
the federal diversity of citizenship statute itself is inconsistent with the “association of 
stockholders” view of the corporation reflected in Citizens United.   Logically, if a 
corporation were an association of shareholders, then the corporation would be present 
wherever the shareholders resided.  Because shareholders of large publicly held 
corporations generally reside in all fifty states, this would undermine the plain 
meaning of the federal diversity of citizenship statute for corporations.   
                                                 
106 WRIGHT & MILLER, 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3630.1 (3d ed.) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has held that the state citizenship of all members of an unincorporated association will be 
taken into account in determining the association’s citizenship when a question of diversity 
jurisdiction arises.  In the words of the Supreme Court in its seminal decision in Carden v. Arkoma 
Associates, a federal court should count ‘the citizenship of all [an entity’s] members.’  That basic 
principle has remained intact since 1990.”) (citations omitted).  See, e.g., 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 
880 F.3d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 2018) (“For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a limited liability 
company “is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.”); Mut. Assignment 
& Indem. Co. v. Lind-Waldock & Co., LLC, 364 F.3d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Lind-Waldock is 
a limited liability company, which means that it is a citizen of every state of which any member is 
a citizen; this may need to be traced through multiple levels if any of its members is itself a 
partnership or LLC.”); Hale v. M.J.J.K., LLC, Civil Action No. 12–1515, 2013 WL 6287823, at 
*2 (E.D. La. 2013) (“Accordingly, the party invoking federal jurisdiction ‘must list the citizenship 
of each member of each limited liability company to properly allege diversity of jurisdiction.’”).  
Courts sometimes allow a party seeking to establish diversity jurisdiction to take limited discovery 
into the citizenship of an unincorporated association’s members.  See, e.g., Dougherty Funding, 
LLC v. Gateway Ethanol, LLC, No. 08-XC-2213-JWL, 2008 WL 2354965 (D. Kan. June 5, 2008) 
(permitting defendant to take written discovery of the plaintiff’s citizenship in order to ascertain if 
diversity jurisdiction exists).  But see MCP Trucking, LLC v. Speedy Heavy Hauling, Inc., Civ. 
Act. No. 14-CV-02427-PAB, 2014 WL 5002116 (D. Col. Oct. 6, 2014) (denying jurisdictional 
recovery and remanding action to state court even after acknowledging that further discovery could 
demonstrate that diversity of citizenship existed); Osborn & Barr Comm., Inc. v. EMC Corp., Inc., 
No. 4:08-CV-87 CAS, 2008 WL 341664 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2008) (denying motion for discovery). 
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C. Corporate Taxation and Corporate Restructuring  
In the world of business, as a general rule, juridical entities pay taxes and 
associations of investors do not.  Since 1909, corporate income has been subject to a 
federal tax.  This income is typically taxed a second time when it is distributed as 
dividends that are liable to the individual income tax.  The corporate income tax 
reflects the view that a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from its 
shareholders.   
Under certain circumstances it is possible to organize a corporation under 
Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code requirements.  Subchapter S gives 
corporations with 100 or fewer shareholders that meet certain other requirements the 
limited liability benefit of incorporation while allowing them to be taxed as 
associations of members such as partnerships.  The ability of the state to waive the 
taxes imposed on corporate entities does not undermine our argument that the 
existence of corporate income tax indicates that corporations are juridical entities 
separate and apart from their shareholders.  After all, individuals who earn less than a 
certain minimum income are exempt from the income tax, but such an exemption does 
not render such people non-entities.   
Rather, the system of Subchapter S reflects another manifestation of our core 
premise: corporations as a factual matter depend on legal authorization and are 
historically subject to legislation tailored to the unique issues that flow from their 
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status as distinct legal persons.  As we continue to explain, the Supreme Court has 
long recognized this reality, and allowed legislators wide leeway to regulate the 
conduct of their powerful creators.   
Thus, in applying the tax laws, the Supreme Court has made clear that neither 
the government nor stockholders may ignore the corporate form.  In Moline 
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,107 a stockholder who owned all the stock of the 
corporation attempted to ignore the corporate form and be taxed directly on a 
corporate transaction, to his economic benefit.  The Supreme Court did not oblige.  In 
United States v. Cumberland Service Co.,108 the government was the party seeking to 
ignore the separate legal existence of the corporation and treat the stockholders as the 
parties subject to tax.  The Supreme Court was not sympathetic and adhered to a 
consistent view: under the state laws that create corporations, they are separate entities 
from those who own their equity. 
Similarly, the way that corporate governance changes when a corporation 
becomes insolvent undercuts associational claims.  If the corporation is an association 
of individuals in part for expressive purposes, it is strange that if the entity becomes 
insolvent, most of the governance rights of the stockholders can be defeased.109  Under 
                                                 
107 319 U.S. 436 (1943).  
108 338 U.S. 451 (1950). 
109 See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101–02 (Del. 
2007) (noting that a corporation’s “creditors take the place of the shareholders as the residual 
beneficiaries of any increase in value” and therefore “have standing to bring derivative claims 
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corporate law itself, upon insolvency, the focus of the equitable duties of the directors 
shifts to preserving the value of the entity for the benefit of another input—the 
debtholders.110  These debtholders, of course, are in reality extant before insolvency, 
and under the law, have to be paid first.  Yet, they spring into greater life only when a 
company cannot pay its bills.  In insolvency, therefore, would the Citizens United 
majority consider the entity an association of debtholders?   
D. Corporate Criminal Liability 
The existence of corporate criminal liability is also inconsistent with the 
assertion in Citizens United that corporations are associations of shareholders rather 
than distinct juridical entities.  It is established that a corporation is “criminally liable 
for the federal crimes its employees or agents commit in its interest.”111  Corporate 
officers, employees, and agents are individually liable for the crimes they commit, for 
the crimes they conspire to commit, for the foreseeable crimes their coconspirators 
                                                 
against directors on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties”); In re Potter 
Instrument Co., 593 F.2d 470, 474–75 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision 
to deny a major shareholder’s petition for a special meeting to elect new directors because the 
“election might result in unsatisfactory management and would probably jeopardize both [the 
corporation’s] rehabilitation and the rights of creditors and stockholders”); cf. Lynn M. LoPucki 
& William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of 
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 127–30 (1990) (noting shareholders’ 
limited ability to object to a plan under the Bankruptcy Code’s “cram down” provisions).   
110 Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101–02. 
111 CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: AN 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43293.pdf. 
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commit, for the crimes whose commission they aid and abet, and for the crimes whose 
perpetrators they assist after the fact. 
The existence of corporate criminal liability is an example of the corporation 
being considered a legal person.  At common law, corporations were viewed as 
incapable of committing crimes.  For example, according to Blackstone, “a 
corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in its corporate capacity; 
though its members may, in their distinct individual capacities.”112  Thus the view that 
corporations cannot commit crimes is rooted in a conception of corporations as 
“associations of shareholders.”  Once the corporation came to be perceived as a 
distinct juridical entity, courts recognized that corporations could be criminally liable 
for first for “failure to honor certain legal obligations (nonfeasance); then for the 
inadequate manner in which it performed certain legal obligations (malfeasance).”113  
By the early 20th century, the idea of a corporation as a juridical entity had 
become firmly entrenched and the Supreme Court officially recognized corporate 
criminal liability in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States: 
It is true that there are some crimes which, in their nature, cannot be 
committed by corporations. But there is a large class of 
offenses . . . wherein the crime consists in purposely doing the things 
prohibited by statute.  In that class of crimes we see no good reason why 
corporations may not be held responsible for and charged with the 
knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority 
conferred upon them.  If it were not so, many offenses might go 
                                                 
112 1 BLACK. COMM., 476. 
113 Id. 
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unpunished and acts be committed in violation of law where, as in the 
present case, the statute requires all persons, corporate or private, to 
refrain from certain practices, forbidden in the interest of public 
policy.114 
 
The reference in Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. to corporations as 
corporate “persons” is wholly inconsistent with the conception in Citizens United.  
Contemporary corporate criminal law is modeled on individual criminal law, and is 
rooted in notions of personal responsibility: 
Substantive bases of liability, evidence, procedure and rationale have 
been constructed initially for individuals.  Over the years, doctrine has 
been transposed to corporations.  The model contains two features.  One 
is an identification of persons as the subjects of criminal law.  The other 
feature is an assumption that the elements of criminal law applicable to 
individuals also apply to all persons. . . . [P]redominant practice remains 
individualistic: corporations are treated as persons in the way that 
individuals are treated.115 
 
Thus, corporate criminal liability uniformly treats culpable entities as 
individuals, not as associations of persons.  Corporate criminal law requires that the 
corporation be an entity.116  Treating the corporation as an association of individuals 
would require either abandoning the notion of corporate criminal responsibility or it 
would require assigning such responsibility to the “associations of citizens” who 
constitute the corporation. 
                                                 
114 212 U.S. 481, 494‒95 (1909). 
115 Steven Walt & Wililiam S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal 
Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263 (1991). 
116 Id. at 264.  
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The Supreme Court also has refused the plea of someone who owned all the 
stock of a corporation to quash a subpoena directed towards the corporation.  That 
singular equity owner attempted to assert his own privilege under the Fifth 
Amendment to stop the government from procuring information from the corporation 
he dominated and controlled.  The Supreme Court refused to allow his claim that the 
corporation was indistinct from him, stating in Braswell v. United States, “petitioner 
asserts no self-incrimination claim on behalf of the corporations; it is well established 
that such artificial entities are not protected by the Fifth Amendment.”117  
Braswell was no novelty; it built on longstanding case law denying corporations 
the ability to assert Fifth Amendment rights, while allowing their officers and 
stockholders to do so in their personal capacities.118  The Court has also recognized 
that the corporation is distinct from its officers and stockholders in applying 
substantive criminal statutes, such as RICO.  In Cedric Kushner Promotions Ltd v. 
King, for example, the Supreme Court held that the president and only stockholder of 
a corporation was a different “person” from the corporate enterprise under the RICO 
statute.119   
                                                 
117 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988).   
118 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944); 
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (applying same concept of distinctiveness to deny a 
partnership the ability to assert Fifth Amendment privilege).   
119 533 U.S. 158, 160 (2001) (“[W]e conclude that the ‘person’ and ‘enterprise’ here are distinct 
and that the RICO provision applies.”).   
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And the punishments meted out to corporations highlight the distinct nature of 
a corporation from a human—corporate criminal law takes seriously the distinction 
and therefore the punishment scheme is far different.120  There have been many 
situations where corporations have in fact caused death or mass destruction.121  If the 
same conduct were committed by a human being, she might have been executed, or 
as fatal from a business perspective, “incapacitated” by incarceration for decades.  
Corporations are not treated this way.   
They “live” on.  For instance, because of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 
2010, BP pled guilty to felony manslaughter and was fined $4 billion.122  Yet only 7 
                                                 
120 For instance, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual has a specific, separate section for the 
“Sentencing of Organizations.”  U.S.S.G. Ch. 8.  Unlike the rest of the Sentencing Guidelines, 
which focus on determining the amount of prison time to sentence an individual to based on the 
level of the crime and any mitigating or criminal history, the “Sentencing of Organizations” 
chapter focuses on fines, remedies for the harm, special assessments, and forfeitures.  Id.     
121 E.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court Needs a 
Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 813–14 (2010) (documenting the 
environmental costs of the Exxon Valdez spill that, although it did not cause any human deaths, 
harmed the Alaska ecosystem for decades); Josh Barbanel, Fatal Explorer Accidents Involving 
Bad Tires Soared in ‘99, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/19/business/fatal-explorer-accidents-involving-bad-tires-
soared-in-99.html (“52 people died in 40 fatal crashes of Explorers in which police reports listed 
tire problems as a contributing factor . . . [and] the trend could have been detected long before, if 
officials had used the federal fatality data as an early-warning system to identify possible 
manufacturing defects.”).   
122 See Press Release, Office of Public Affairs, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead 
Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes, and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding 
Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bp-exploration-and-
production-inc-agrees-plead-guilty-felony-manslaughter-environmental. 
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years later, in 2017, BP’s revenues exceeded $240 billion,123 despite the fact that a 
human convicted of federal voluntary manslaughter would likely still be incarcerated 
and unable to earn a living during incarceration.124  If a corporation’s human agents 
acted with the requisite mens rea, they can be imprisoned or executed.125  But notably, 
these human agents are not the stockholders, typically, but managers.  The criminal 
law has a distinct regime of punishment for these human actors.  This distinction 
between corporations and flesh-and-blood human beings in the high-stakes area of 
criminal law is important and further supports our thesis.   
IV. The Core Assertion in Citizens United Is at Odds with Law and 
Empirical Fact: Shareholders in Corporations Are Not Associated with 
Each Other 
A frustrating aspect of Citizens United is that the core concept—that 
corporations are associations of shareholders—is never developed in the opinion.  It 
stands as a mere assertion.  Here, we consider the extent to which this assertion is an 
accurate description of the corporation.  The notion in Citizens United that 
corporations are associations of shareholders reflects the view that corporate 
                                                 
123 BP Annual Report, Form 20-F, at 125, 
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/investors/bp-annual-report-and-form-20f-
2017.pdf 
124 Voluntary manslaughter carries a base offense level of 29, resulting in a recommended sentence 
of between 87 and 108 months, based on an offender with no criminal history and no downward 
departures.  See U.S.S.G. § 2A.1.3.   
125 See, e.g., Press Release, Department of Justice, Former Enron Chief Financial Officer Andrew 
Fastow Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Securities and Wire Fraud, Agrees to Cooperate 
with Enron Investigation (Jan. 14, 2004), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-
releases/former-enron-chief-financial-officer-andrew-fastow-pleads-guilty-to-conspiracy-to-
commit-securities-and-wire-fraud (Fastow sentenced to 10 years in prison for his plea).    
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shareholders have something in common, but there is nothing in the actual, real world 
relationship among corporate shareholders that suggests that this is the case. 
 Corporate law scholars of all persuasions, but particularly those associated 
with the political right, have long been suspicious of arguments that corporate 
managers should be allowed to use corporate funds for non-business purposes, such 
as for advancing pet causes or political views.126  In fact, Justice Scalia made this 
point succinctly at a stage in his jurisprudence earlier than Citizens United when he 
said, “[t]he Campbell Soup Company does not exist to promote a message.”127   
A principal concern among those taking this accepted position is that 
stockholders are in fact weak in comparison to the managers of corporations, and 
poorly positioned to constrain them even when it comes to central issues, such as the 
nature of the company’s profit making strategy and executive compensation.128  
They, therefore, argued that managers should be required to focus, within the 
                                                 
126 Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 49, at 346–52 (showing that 
conservatives like Hayek, Friedman, Arrow, Easterbrook, Maine, Jensen, Henry Butler, Stephen 
Bainbridge, and Roberta Romano all take this view). 
127 Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 467 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).   
128 Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 49, at 352–53; Henry Butler, The 
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 107 n.20 (1989); Henry N 
Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate 
Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1223–24 
(1999) (“Corporate managers have enough trouble meeting the challenges of maximizing 
shareholder value without diverting their attention to saving the world.”).  See generally MARK 
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE (1996). 
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boundaries of external law and ethics, solely on increasing the profitability of the 
firm, because that was the only common objective of the stockholders and it was 
difficult enough to hold managers accountable on that dimension alone.129  If 
managers were instead allowed to act for diffuse purposes, these commentators 
viewed them as being freed from accountability, because they could then justify their 
actions on so many grounds, that the rights given to stockholders would not be potent 
enough to keep them loyal to the stockholders.130  For stockholders therefore to be 
viewed as effective in checking the use of corporate funds for political spending, 
requires assuming away long accepted realities held by most corporate law 
commentators, especially those coming at the question from a conservative 
perspective. 
                                                 
129 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 70 (“[W]hen voters hold dissimilar preferences it 
is not possible to aggregate their preferences into a consistent system of choices. . . . [S]ingle-
objective firms are likely to prosper relative to others. This suggests . . . why the law makes no 
effort to require firms to adhere to any objective other than profit maximization (as constrained by 
particular legal rules).”); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. 
REV.  923, 961 (1984) (pursuit of ends other than profit maximization is “especially disturbing 
because profit maximization is the only goal for which we can at least theoretically posit 
shareholder unanimity”); see also Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, supra note 49, 
at 351–52 (collecting sources highlighting that investors’ only common trait is a focus on returns).   
130 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1191–92 (1981) (“A manager responsible 
to two conflicting interests is in fact answerable to neither.”); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic 
Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 32 (1991) (“[T]he primary beneficiaries of 
nonshareholder constituency statutes are incumbent managers, who can justify virtually any 
decision they make on the grounds that it benefits some constituency of the firm.”) (emphasis 
omitted).   
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The reason all commentators agree is that there is no empirical basis on which 
to assume that the stockholders of a business corporation have any common interest 
other than obtaining a good return on their investment.  Put simply, their only shared 
interest is profiting on their stock investment.  For that reason, many conservative 
corporate law scholars have argued that corporate directors should be required to 
focus solely on advancing the best interests of stockholders, within the bounds of the 
law and ethics, as they have no legitimate basis for using corporate funds for any 
purpose unrelated to generating profits.  If there is surplus that can be used for that 
purpose, these commentators argue that it ought to be returned to the stockholders 
themselves, who can then use it individually and legitimately for their own purposes, 
which might include advancing the diverse charitable and political causes they 
support.131  Citizens United ignored the reality that no corporate law scholars or 
practitioners take the position that stockholders invest in the stock of business 
corporations for expressive purposes.  
 As important, Citizens United ignored another undeniable reality about public 
business corporations: most of their investors are not human beings who can at least 
be plausibly thought to have joined together for associational reasons unrelated to 
                                                 
131 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 135 (2002).   
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profit, albeit through the strange means of co-investing in a for-profit business.132  
Contrary to the inference in Citizens United, the vast majority of shares in U.S. public 
corporations—approximately 80%—are primarily owned by institutions, such as 
pension funds and mutual funds.133  These institutional investors are organized as 
separate juridical entities (corporations, LLCs, LLPs, LPs, and statutory trusts). Most 
shareholders are not individuals.  And the institutions and individuals who own shares 
are not “associated” with each other in any meaningful sense. 
 
                                                 
132 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1521–22 (2007) (the 
concentration of equity ownership in the hands of a few large institutional investors has “created 
a class of shareholders singularly focused on shareholder value”).   
133 Charles McGrath, 80% Of Equity Market Cap Held By Institutions, Pensions & Investments, 
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:45 AM), http://www.pionline.com/article/ 
20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions; see also 
Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1922 
(2013). 
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Corporations are comprised of a mix of passive and active investors.  And as 
Roberta Romano has shown, these institutional investors are riddled with conflicts of 
interest that undermine the assumption that shareholders are an association or 
community in any sense of the word.134  Managers of corporate pension funds and 
financial institutions have other business relations with the companies in which they 
own shares, and those relationships generate conflicts of interest that prevent them 
from opposing corporate management.135  Public pension funds (the pension funds of 
state and local government employees) are similarly riddled with conflicts.136  And 
the conflicts among the various groups of shareholders is acute.  Discrete shareholder 
groups will have idiosyncratic preferences over almost every conceivable issue from 
environmental issues, plant re-locations and closings, in-state employment, and 
leveraged buyouts,137 to name but a few. 
What is common about all of these institutional investors is that almost none of 
them have the capital of human, end-user investors because those investors have 
chosen to give it to them to join an association of investors committed to a common 
                                                 
134 Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993); John Brooks, Corporate Pension Fund Asset Management, in 
Twentieth Century Fund, ABUSE ON WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE SECURITIES 
MARKETS 224 (1980). 
135 Brooks, supra note 134, at [NTD: ADD PINCITE]. 
136 See Romano, supra note 134, at 799–839. 
137 See id. at 807 (describing an episode in which the Illinois state treasurer threatened to withhold 
investments by the state pension fund in a leveraged buyout fund if the buyout firm did not ensure 
that an in-state printing plant continued to operate without reduced employment). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118 
67 
 
set of social or political values.138  These funds, however, do not advertise themselves 
as vehicles for political expression, and have their own agency problems.  To wit, 
some of them vote their stock on stockholder proposals without reference to their 
stated values and instead just vote with all the other funds in the fund complex.139  
Most investors save to pay for two things: college for their children and retirement for 
themselves.  As to each, Americans are, by dint of economic pressures and tax 
incentives, required to give over their wealth to institutional investors.  With the 
decline of defined benefit pension plans, most Americans have no practical choice but 
to give over a substantial portion of their earnings every month to the mutual funds in 
                                                 
138 There is a the small subset of investors who have chosen to invest in so-called socially 
responsible mutual funds, which do pick stocks based on criteria like the social responsibility of 
the corporations in which the funds invest. 
139 By way of observation, in a prior work, one of us looked at the behavior of Vanguard’s FTSE 
Social Index Fund, which is marketed to socially conscious investors and only invests in 
companies that meet certain social, human rights, and environmental criteria.  That investigation 
revealed that the Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund is subject to the same voting guidelines that 
govern all Vanguard funds and votes identically to other Vanguard funds.  Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
Making It Easier for Directors to “Do The Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 250 (2014) 
(documenting this reality and stating that “there are socially responsible investment funds that 
appear to vote their shares in line with all the other funds of their mutual fund family, and to take 
no special efforts to vote in a way that is consistent with the fund’s supposed commitment to social 
responsibility”).  A look at the up-to-date voting data suggests that the FTSE Social Index fund 
continues to vote in exactly the same manner as all other Vanguard funds.  Compare Vanguard 
FTSE Social Index Fund, Form N-PX, Aug. 31, 2017, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-
stewardship/supportingfiles/proxyvote0213.pdf?v=1506 522482522, with Vanguard 500 Index 
Fund, Form N-PX, Aug. 31, 2017, 
https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/supportingfiles/proxyvote0040.pdf?v=15065
22482519; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood 
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE 
L.J. 1870, 1914 n.150 (collecting sources showing that multiple institutional investors vote as a 
complex).    
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the menu selected for them by their employer.140  These investments must remain with 
institutions until the worker is near retirement age, at the price of a severe tax 
penalty.141  Most workers cannot choose individual companies but must as a practical 
matter give their money to a mutual fund.142 
As a result of this incentive system, it is now the case that five to ten mutual 
funds control a large percentage of the stock in American public companies.143  For 
instance, “[i]n 2015 the Big Three [BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street] together 
constituted the largest owner of nearly 90% of public companies in the S&P 500.”144  
                                                 
140 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees 
and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1485 (2015) (“The menu of mutual 
funds from which employees choose is ultimately constructed by the employer . . . .”). “In the 
largest 200 defined contribution plans, the average number of funds on the menu is twenty-two.”  
William A. Birdthistle, EMPIRE OF THE FUND 143 (2016).  
141 I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i) (distributions from 401(k)s cannot be made until the employee attains 
the age of 59 ½); id. at § 72(t)(1) (“If any taxpayer receives any amount from a qualified retirement 
plan . . . the taxpayer’s tax under this chapter for the taxable year in which such amount is received 
shall be increased by an amount equal to 10 percent . . .”). 
142 Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification, supra note 140, at 1485 (“The most common type of 
investment options in 401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment vehicles that pool funds 
managed by a professional fund manager.”).  One important reason investment options are 
restricted is the structure of the liability safe harbor that plan sponsors can take advantage of by 
offering only certain investments.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1.   
143 Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 498–99 
(2018) (“From 1980 to 1996, large institutional investors nearly doubled their share of ownership of 
U.S. corporations from under 30% to over 50%.  By 2010, institutional investors held approximately 
80% of the U.S. stock market. . . . Mutual funds have been the largest drivers of this growth: in 1980, 
they owned $70 billion in assets, and in 2009, that number was up to $7.2 trillion. ”). 
144 Id. at 509 (“[T]he passive fund industry is remarkably concentrated—BlackRock, Vanguard, and 
State Street (the “Big Three”) together hold 70% of the ETF market.  Index fund market share data 
are not publically available, but recent estimates put Vanguard as holding 75% of the market.  As a 
result of the growth of passive investing, the Big Three have become significant players in 
governance.”). 
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None of these mutual funds pretend that the funds they receive result from the desire 
of their worker-investors to empower the mutual fund to engage in speech or advance 
good causes on their behalves.  In fact, major institutional investors recognize that the 
only common interest of their investors is in a good return, and they assume, rightly, 
that they hold funds of investors with widely disparate political and social views and 
that the funds cannot reconcile those views in any rational way other than by focusing 
the fund solely on getting a solid profit for them from its investing activities.145  And 
even as to pension funds that might be affiliated with labor unions or state 
                                                 
145 Likely because their diverse group of investors have different political views, Vanguard 
believes that decisions on corporate and social policy should be left up to the board.  VANGUARD, 
STEWARDSHIP POLICY 11 (2016), https://global.vanguard.com/documents/stewardship-policy.pdf 
(“Proposals in this category [i.e., “corporate and social policy issues”], initiated primarily by 
shareholders, typically request that the company disclose or amend certain business practices. . . . 
[These] proposals may address concerns with which the Board philosophically agrees, but absent 
a compelling economic impact on shareholder value (e.g., proposals to require expensing of stock 
options), the funds will typically abstain from voting on these proposals. This reflects the belief 
that regardless of our philosophical perspective on the issue, these decisions should be the province 
of company management unless they have a significant, tangible impact on the value of a fund’s 
investment and management is not responsive to the matter.”).  Blackrock’s explicit policy is not 
to vote on corporate political activities.  BLACKROCK, PROXY  VOTING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. 
SECURITIES 13–14 (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-
responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf (“Finally, we believe that it is not the role of 
shareholders to suggest or approve corporate political activities; therefore we generally do not 
support proposals requesting a shareholder vote on political activities or expenditures.”).  Fidelity 
and State Street do not have explicit policies.  See Yafit Cohn, Political Contributions and 
Lobbying, HARV. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. BLOG, (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/18/political-contributions-and-lobbying-proposals/ 
(“Not all large institutional shareholders disclose official positions on political 
contributions/lobbying proposals. Fidelity and State Street Global Advisors, for example, do not 
expressly discuss such proposals in their proxy voting guidelines.”).  But data complied by 
Professor Hirst supports the notion that institutional investors routinely vote no or abstain from 
votes on corporate political activities.  Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. CORP. 
L. 217, 244 (2018) (observing that Vanguard did not vote for any political spending resolutions in 
2014).  
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governments, the fiduciaries do not have free license to use the fund’s investment 
capital as they wish.  Rather, basic concepts of fiduciary duty and the relevant federal 
statute,146 require that pension trustees focus on prudent investing to generate returns 
sufficient to pay the pensioners the pensions due to them.147 
Because of these developments, the long understood reality that the 
stockholders of business corporations do not invest for any common interest other 
than receiving a good return, and certainly not because of any shared associational 
interest in particular political or social goals, has become even more inarguable.  The 
largest and most influential stockholders of American public companies have names 
like Vanguard 500 Index Fund, Fidelity Contrafund, iShares Core S&P 500, and 
American Funds Investment Company of America.148  Those names make clear that 
those funds are focused on styles of investing designed for one purpose: to generate a 
good, risk-adjusted return. 
                                                 
146 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq; see also Interpretive Bulletin Relating to 
Investing in Economically Targeted Investments, 73 FR 61734-01, 35. (“ERISA’s plain text thus 
establishes a clear rule that in the course of discharging their duties, fiduciaries may never 
subordinate the economic interests of the plan [participants and beneficiaries] to unrelated 
objectives [ ].”).  
147 See Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson, & Mark A. Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create 
Social Value, at *7–8 (ECGI Working Paper, Mar. 2008), 
http://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalbrestgilsonwolfson.pdf 
(“Plan fiduciaries that are subject to ERISA may take ESG considerations into account in making 
portfolio decisions only if doing so does not negatively impact investment returns.”).   
148 See The 25 Largest Mutual Funds, MARKET WATCH (2018), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/tools/mutual-fund/top25largest.   
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By contrast, Citizens United was a case the Supreme Court majority used to 
change the law as to business corporations but that involved an unusual situation 
having nothing in common with the key issues motivating the restriction on corporate 
political spending in McCain-Feingold.  Citizens United was a non-profit whose 
express purpose, by its name, was to “promote the social welfare through informing 
and educating the public on conservative ideas and positions on issues, including 
national defense, the free enterprise system, belief in God, and the family as the basic 
unit of society.”149  Citizens United had an annual budget of around $12 million 
collected from individuals and for-profit corporations.150  Citizens United released a 
90-minute documentary that was highly critical of Hillary Clinton, depicting 
interviews with political commentators and other interested people.  The film was 
promoted with advertisements that contained pejorative statements about Senator 
Clinton.  As a not-for-profit entity with a particular political point of view, Citizens 
United’s contributors are hardly representative of the diverse shareholding population 
of a large, public, for-profit corporation.151 
                                                 
149 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, Joint Appendix at 10A, 2009 WL 62995 (Jan. 8, 
2009) (Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Dec. 21, 2007)).   
150 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320. 
151 In some of its jurisprudence dealing with entities, the Supreme Court seems tempted to give 
greater credence to arguments by closely held business corporations arguing that they should be 
able to make claims to constitutional protection, such as in arguing that a corporation’s religious 
freedom has been impinged, than it would indulge from a public corporation.  See Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that the Affordable Care Act 
contraception mandate, as applied to a closely held for-profit corporation, violated the Religious 
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V.The Supreme Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence Addressing Unions 
Supports the Reasonableness of McCain-Feingold’s Approach to Corporate 
Speech  
The Supreme Court’s failure to take into account these basic facts about the 
relationship of stockholders to business corporations is in irreconcilable tension with 
another strand of its First Amendment jurisprudence.  In the case of labor unions, 
where there is much greater reason to think that there may be shared viewpoints 
among employees even if they do not all wish to join the union, the Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
Freedom Restoration Act).  Even corporate law scholars sympathetic to the notion that all 
corporations should be able to advance such claims view it as bad corporate law to use the number 
of stockholders as a dividing line for the exercise of rights.  Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 333889.  The reason for that is inarguable: 
corporate law itself makes no distinction on this ground and there is little basis to believe that the 
stockholders of more closely held businesses tend to be more united around a religious or other 
non-monetary purpose than those of public corporations.  Their argument for the corporate 
exercise of rights is simple and different: they contend that corporate boards are elected and have 
broad discretion while in office to advance any lawful purpose, unless constrained by the charter 
from doing so.  Lyman P.Q. Johnson and David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 
BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (2015) (“State corporate law does not require corporations to prioritize profits 
over competing considerations. This fact has ramifications that extend far beyond the particular 
activities—religious observance—at issue in the Hobby Lobby cases. All business corporations 
(and non-profits too, for that matter) must generate profit in order to survive.  That is simply a fact 
of life.  But corporate law confers on [boards] broad discretion to determine the extent to which 
they choose to temper the pursuit of profit by regard for other values.”).  But see Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 4–5 (2014) (“The law thus has long recognized 
William Klein’s point that, despite the utility of the fiction of corporate legal personhood, it is 
critical to remember that treating the corporation as an entity separate from the people making it 
up bears no relation to economic reality.”).  They do not conflate the corporation with its 
stockholders or view it as an association of them.  Rather, these scholars just believe corporations, 
although distinct from their human constituents, should have all the rights of human beings, while 
recognizing that they do not have all of the obligations that come from being a human citizen. 
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focus has been on ensuring that no worker in a union workplace has her dues used 
by the union for any form of political speech.   
This jurisprudence—restricting unions from using dues for political 
purposes—arose because collective bargaining agreements often contain “agency 
shop” clauses, which require each employee to pay union dues.152  In Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education, the Court addressed whether agency shop clauses 
violated “the constitutional rights of government employees who object to public-
sector unions as such or to various union activities financed by the compulsory 
service fees.”153  Adopting the view that freedom of association includes “refusing 
to associate,” the Supreme Court took the view that the dues of union members could 
not be used to fund political expenditures, but only the costs of collective bargaining 
and representing workers in disputes with the employer.154  To the extent the union 
wished to act as a collective action mechanism for speech—an association for 
speech, to use the linguistics of the Citizens United majority155—it had to 
                                                 
152 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 212 (1977).   
153 Id. at 211.   
154 Id. at 233–36 (“We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the 
expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other 
ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative.  Rather, the 
Constitution requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments 
paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing 
so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment.”).   
155 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356 (“Yet certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that 
have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same political speech.”).   
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specifically solicit donations from members for that purpose or otherwise run afoul 
of the First Amendment.156  And as to non-union members in the workplace, the 
union could only demand a payment that could be directly traced to “collective 
bargaining activities.”157   
In adopting McCain-Feingold’s provisions requiring corporations to act 
through PACs using only the voluntary contributions of stockholders, rather than 
treasury funds, Congress took into fair account accepted principles of corporate law, 
which recognized that stockholders in business corporations did not buy stock so 
their entrusted capital could be used for political speech.  Indeed, in recognizing that 
reality, Congress also borrowed from the Supreme Court’s own concern about 
compelled speech, as exemplified in Abood and its progeny.158  Even less than fellow 
workers, fellow stockholders cannot be plausibly deemed, by virtue of simply 
investing in the same stock, to have any shared political interests, much less to be 
                                                 
156 Abood, 431 U.S. at 233–36.   
157 Id. at 236.   
158 See Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First 
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 269–74 (1981) (reasoning on the basis of Abood that a requirement 
that corporations use separate segregated funds, raised by stockholder solicitation of others, rather 
than corporate assets, would be constitutional); Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 167, 
at 451 (“In McCain-Feingold, Congress actually took an approach to corporate political activity 
that was consistent with the Supreme Court’s own reasoning in Abood. . . . McCain-Feingold gave 
strong consideration to the expressive rights of stockholders not to have corporations use corporate 
funds for political purposes without their consent, just as the Supreme Court had given primacy in 
Abood and other cases to the right of workers not to have their dues used for political purposes 
without their consent.”). 
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said to be associated for the purpose of using the corporation as a shared vehicle for 
political expression.   
But in the past decade, members of the Supreme Court began to express the 
view that even requiring a non-union member to contribute to core collective 
bargaining costs violated the First Amendment because it compelled the non-union 
member to contribute to speech he did not support.159  These vocal expressions 
almost seemed to solicit the aptly named case of Janus v. American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31,160 which was decided just this 
year.  In Janus, the Supreme Court overturned the aspect of Abood and its progeny 
that allowed unions to compel employees to fund activities associated with collective 
bargaining but allowed members to opt-out of funding the union’s political activities, 
and held that the First Amendment gave a non-union employee a right to decline to 
pay anything at all to the union, even for the costs of bargaining for a raise that would 
benefit all employees and even though the union was bound by law to represent all 
employees in the workplace.161  That is, under Abood, employees who declined to 
                                                 
159 See Friedrichs v. California Teachers Assn., 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam); Harris v. 
Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. Service Employees, 132 S.Ct. 2277 (2012); see also Janus 
v. Am. Fed. Of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2487 (2018) 
(“Today, the Court succeeds in its 6–year campaign to reverse Abood.”) (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
160 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).  
161 Id. at 2486 (“Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from 
a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the 
employee affirmatively consents to pay.  By agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First 
Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed.  Rather, to be effective, the waiver 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118 
76 
 
join the union that was designated to conduct collective bargaining on their behalf 
were not assessed full union dues but must instead only pay what was known as an 
“agency fee.”162  In overturning Abood, the Janus Court found that “[f]orcing free 
and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable raises serious 
First Amendment concerns.”163  Janus involved an Illinois law that required public 
employees to pay fees to subsidize a public employee union, even if they chose not to 
join and objected to the positions the union took in collective bargaining and related 
activities.  This law was held to violate the free speech rights of nonmembers of the 
union by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public 
concern.   
                                                 
must be freely given and shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence.  Unless employees clearly 
and affirmatively consent before any money is taken from them, this standard cannot be met.”) 
(citations omitted); id. at 2487 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (“For over 40 years, Abood struck a stable 
balance between public employees’ First Amendment rights and government entities’ interests in 
running their workforces as they thought proper. . . . The Court’s decisions have long made plain 
that government entities have substantial latitude to regulate their employees’ speech—especially 
about terms of employment—in the interest of operating their workplaces effectively. Abood 
allowed governments to do just that.  While protecting public employees’ expression about non-
workplace matters, the decision enabled a government to advance important managerial 
interests—by ensuring the presence of an exclusive employee representative to bargain with.  Far 
from an ‘anomaly,’ the Abood regime was a paradigmatic example of how the government can 
regulate speech in its capacity as an employer.”) (citations omitted).   
162 The agency fee was a percentage of the union dues that reflected the portion of union dues 
attributable to activities that are “germane to [the union’s] duties as collective bargaining 
representative,” but nonmembers could not be required to fund the union’s political and ideological 
projects.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36.  In labor-law parlance, the outlays in the first category are 
known as “chargeable” expenditures, while those in the latter are labeled “nonchargeable.” 
163 Id. at 2464. 
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The same of course is true for shareholders of corporations that make political 
contributions.  Shareholders in such companies are compelled either to disassociate 
from these firms or to subsidize the private speech in which these companies choose 
to engage.  In fact, the harm of compulsion in campaign expenditures by corporations 
validated in Citizens United is, if anything, even more egregious than the extent of the 
compulsion in Janus. 
In Janus, Mark Janus and his counsel were unable to argue that the union was 
using his dues for political speech; under Abood, the union could not do so and was 
not doing so.  All that the union was able to use the dues for was for the core purpose 
of negotiating for higher wages and benefits of its workforce, and representing 
members of the workforce in disciplinary proceedings with the employer.  If, as the 
Supreme Court found, that was not a sufficiently common purpose to allow the use of 
Mr. Janus’s funds without running afoul of the First Amendment, it seems 
inconceivable how one can rationalize allowing Exxon-Mobil or Walmart to use 
corporate funds for political speech when no basis exists to think that their 
stockholders have any common political viewpoint or have invested to have them 
speak on their behalf.  Even less is there a basis for not giving deference to a 
congressional statute that allowed Exxon-Mobil and Walmart to act in that capacity, 
but only on behalf of those stockholders who affirmatively chose to give them funds 
for that purpose.   
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Janus is aptly named because the policy concerns that animated the case’s 
outcome apply with even more strength to corporations than to unions.  For starters, 
under Abood, union members were only required to pay for core services that did 
not involve political speech, and candidly can be analogized to the stockholders’ 
shared interests in a profit.  Non-union workers would like a raise, just like union 
members, and absent in Janus was any indication of refusal by non-union members 
to accept increases in benefits secured by their union.  As important, stockholders 
are no better positioned to escape compelled corporate speech than workers are to 
escape union bargaining costs.  In fact, on balance escape is harder for ordinary 
investors.  As a practical matter, American workers cannot avoid participating in 
giving their funds to institutional investors or pension funds to save for retirement.164  
None of them do so for expressive purposes.165  The percentage of Americans who 
invest in 401(k) plans is much higher than the percentage of unionized 
workplaces.166  And American investors cannot exit their 401(k) investments, unless 
                                                 
164 Ayres & Curtis, Beyond Diversification, supra note 140, at 1485 (“The menu of mutual funds 
from which employees choose is ultimately constructed by the employer” and “[t]he most common 
type of investment options in 401(k) plans are mutual funds or similar investment vehicles that 
pool funds managed by a professional fund manager.”).   
165 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 70 (investors do not invest for expressive purposes 
but rather to realize a return on their investment).     
166 As of 2010, over 73 million Americans participated in 401(k)–type plans, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 361 (2010),  
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/2012-statab.pdf, but 
only 14.5 million workers belonged to unions, Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union 
Members Summary (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
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they do not wish to save for retirement in a tax-efficient way.167  Furthermore, the 
data would suggest that the amount of compelled speech extracted from a worker by 
use of his retirement funds without his consent for political purposes is much greater 
than would be extracted in core bargaining costs.168 
For present purposes, what is striking is how sensitive the Supreme Court is 
in the case of unions to avoid compelled speech, while ignoring the even stronger 
factors that make clear that corporate political speech cannot rationally be deemed 
                                                 
167 I.R.C. § 72(t)(1) (“If any taxpayer receives any amount from a qualified retirement plan . . . the 
taxpayer’s tax under this chapter for the taxable year in which such amount is received shall be 
increased by an amount equal to 10 percent . . .”); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power 
Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate 
Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 423, 444 (2016).  Citizen United actually suggested that “if 
stockholders did not like the way in which corporations were spending their funds, they could use 
the ‘procedures of corporate democracy’ to elect different directors, amend the charter, or file a 
derivative suit to challenge the expenditure.”  Strine & Walter, Conservative Collision Course, 
supra note 49, at 363 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362).  But the Court’s theory cannot 
be reconciled with a messy reality where stockholders are required to invest their savings in stocks 
with little say on which stocks they are invested in.  Strine, Corporate Power Ratchet, supra note 
167, at 444.  Indeed, the practical reality may suggest that a small-government union member may 
have better odds at changing union leadership than a shareholder has in changing corporate 
governance.   
168 The Heritage Foundation, an organization with a vested interest in overstating union dues, 
suggests that unions charge average and median compulsory dues of $610 and $523 per year, 
respectively.  JAMES SHERK, THE HERITAGE FOUND., UNIONS CHARGE HIGHER DUES AND PAY 
THEIR OFFICERS LARGER SALARIES IN NON-RIGHT-TO-WORK STATES 4 (2015), 
http://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/unions-charge-higher-dues-and-pay-their-officers-
larger-salaries-non-right.  Vanguard suggests that the average and median 401(k) deferral rate for 
employees in the U.S. was 6.8% and 6.0%, respectively.  VANGUARD, HOW AMERICA SAVES 7 
(2018), http://pressroom.vanguard.com/nonindexed/HAS18_062018.pdf.  Even assuming half the 
deferral rate, for the median household—making $59,039 per year—that would translate into over 
$1,700 per year in 401(k) savings compared to estimated union dues of roughly $600 per year, 
nearly 3 times as much.  JESSICA L. SEMEGA, KAYLA R. FONTENOT & MELISSA A. KOLLAR, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016 5 (2017), 
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/P60-259.pdf.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233118 
80 
 
to involve voluntary consent of the stockholders.169  Making this inconsistency more 
plain is the extent to which the Supreme Court discounted the provisions of McCain-
Feingold that gave corporations the right to act as a collective action mechanism for 
the shared interests of their stockholders in political speech.  McCain-Feingold did 
so by prohibiting corporations from making expenditures in favor of the election or 
defeat of political candidates, except through corporate-sponsored PACs.170  But the 
Citizens United majority said that the PAC exception did not allow corporations the 
opportunity to speak politically for two reasons, neither of which makes sense.  The 
first is cost.  In this important area of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Citizens 
United majority was concerned that a PAC’s administrative cost, such as keeping 
receipts for three years, was prohibitive.171  The second is that the speech would be 
separate—it would come from the PAC, not the corporation: “A PAC is a separate 
                                                 
169 Indeed, the Janus majority cited Citizens United only for the proposition that precedent can be 
overturned when the previous decision’s “quality of reasoning” is lacking.  See Citizens United, 
138 S. Ct. at 2479.   
170 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (“It is unlawful for . . . any corporation . . . or any labor organization, to 
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any [federal] election . . . or in connection 
with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the 
foregoing offices . . . .”). 
171 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337–38 (“[E]very PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations 
to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations, 
preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this 
information within 10 days.  And that is just the beginning. PACs must file detailed monthly 
reports with the FEC, which are due at different times depending on the type of election that is 
about to occur[.]”) (citations omitted).   
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association from the corporation.  So the PAC exemption from § 441b’s expenditure 
ban, § 441b(b)(2), does not allow corporations to speak.”172    
But the Supreme Court’s reasoning on this score displays an ignorance of 
corporate law and structure on a basic level.  Most large business corporations rely 
on the conception of the corporation we have articulated for an important reason:  
they use the ability to create distinct legal entities to pursue different business lines 
and opportunities.173  To say Johnson and Johnson or Exxon-Mobil is to name only 
the parent corporation of what is likely many separate corporations or entities.  In 
order to avoid having their legal identity ignored, each of these subsidiaries must be 
accounted for individually and be adequately capitalized.  That is a minor and 
accepted cost of doing business.174  The Court overlooked these basic realities in 
                                                 
172 Id. at 337 (“Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC 
created by a corporation can still speak.”) (citations omitted).   
173 Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group,78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 606 n.1 
(2011) (“In 2010, the one hundred US public companies with the highest annual revenues reported 
an average of 245 major subsidiaries, with 114 as the median.  Only five reported fewer than five 
major subsidiaries.”); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 106 (1986) 
(observing that Cargill “a large privately owned corporation” has “more than 150 subsidiaries in 
at least 35 countries”).  Indeed, this is not a twenty-first century phenomenon.  Professor Eisenberg 
observed the trend towards “megasubsidiaries” in the early 1970s.  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Megasubsidiaries: The Effect of Corporate Structure on Corporate Control, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
1577 (1971) (“Due to a number of recent legal and economic developments, a significant portion 
of the country’s business assets is now held, not only by corporations, but by massive subsidiary 
corporations—megasubsidiaries.”).   
174 Society would appreciate the Citizens United conception of a corporation, if implemented 
elsewhere, as it would decrease the federal deficit.  Because most corporations operate through 
subsidiaries, they decrease their U.S. tax obligations.  Apple, for instance, “has accumulated more 
than $128 billion in profits offshore, and probably much more, that is untaxed by the United States 
and hardly touched by any other country.”  Jesse Drucker & Simon Bowers, After a Tax 
Crackdown, Apple Found a New Shelter for Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), 
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treating the broad PAC provisions in McCain-Feingold as leaving corporations 
subject to a total speech ban.  The Court’s other rationale for that finding—that a 
corporate-funded and controlled PAC’s speech would not be the parent’s speech—
is also implausible.  Apple’s wholly owned subsidiaries are regarded by the customer 
as Apple.  No distinction is involved, and none was exacted of corporations by 
McCain-Feingold’s requirement that corporations restrict themselves to speaking 
through a controlled PAC funded only by voluntary stockholder donations.    
The reality is that shareholders in the modern publicly held corporation are 
nothing special.  Shareholders are no more a part of an “association” than are owners 
of any other financial assets part of associations.  Generally speaking, shareholders 
have no control—indeed they have no say whatsoever—in who buys and sells shares 
and thus enters into the assemblage of investors.  In modern corporations, “shares 
trade on multiple exchanges, the ownership is constantly shifting, and most of the 
owners trade under ‘street names’ that make it very hard even for the IRS to know 
their true identities.”175  Justice Kennedy suggested that PAC compliance with 
                                                 
ttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html.  At a 21% tax rate, Apple 
would owe the US Treasury over $26 billion if the Citizen United majority’s concept of a 
corporation—absent subsidiary—was realized.  Most of that $128 billion in offshore profits was 
made in the Isle of Jersey, which has a population of about 100,000.  ISLE OF JERSEY, CENSUS 
(2011), https://www.gov.je/SiteCollectionDocuments/Government%20and%20administration/ 
R%20Chapter1TotalPopulation%2020120808%20SU.pdf.  Each resident of Jersey would have to 
purchase over 1,000 iPhones each for that much profit to be realized.   
175 Avi-Yonah, supra note 33, at 1046. 
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McCain-Feingold “might explain why fewer than 2,000 of the millions of 
corporations in this country have PACs.”176  But the reason corporations struggled to 
raise money under McCain-Feingold has nothing to do with the practical hurdles of 
setting up a PAC.  Rather, corporations failed to raise money from their stockholders 
because corporate law scholars have been right for years: corporations are not 
associations of individuals, and have no realistic chance of getting stockholders to 
voluntarily give money to them for political speech.177  The empirical reality the 
Supreme Court missed in Citizens United is that when Exxon-Mobil asked for money, 
stockholders did not say yes.178   
  
                                                 
176 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 338.   
177 Id. at 338 (observing that few corporate PACs were formed under McCain-Feingold). 
178 As Professor Pildes has observed “[i]f an Exxon CEO decided to commit one week of profits 
to spending on elections, he would have over $800 million to spend (in the pre-Citizens United 
world in 2008, Exxon’s PAC raised only $950,000 in voluntary contributions).”  Richard H. Pildes, 
Is the Supreme Court a ‘Majoritarian’ Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 113.  Most of the 
funds likely came from Exxon-Mobil managers subject to implicit employment pressures.  
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1489 n.371 
(“[C]orporate PACs raise almost all of their money from corporate employees . . .”).   




VI. Corporations are State-Created Legal Fictions 
In the previous sections of this Article, we showed that corporations are not 
“associations of shareholders” as a descriptive matter.  Here we make two related 
points.  First, the Court’s statement in Citizens United that corporations are 
“associations of citizens” is not supported by citations.179  It is a mere assertion without 
support or foundation.  Second, and more importantly, we argue that the appropriate 
source for determining whether a corporation is an entity or an association of 
shareholders is state law.  As the Supreme Court pointed out in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of America, “state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities 
whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law.”180  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Powell further observed that the entire U.S. “free market system 
depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation—except in the rarest situations—
is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the 
corporate law of the State of its incorporation.”181   
The point here is that, absent action by the U.S. Congress, the question of 
whether a corporation is an association of shareholders or an entity is a matter of state, 
not federal, law.  As we have also shown, the Supreme Court itself has long accepted 
                                                 
179 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356 (stating without citation that corporations are “associations 
of citizens”). 
180 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1649 (1987). 
181 Id.  See also Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66, 84 (1976); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F. 2d. 406 (D.C. Cir 1990)).   
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this fundamental fact in its jurisprudence addressing a myriad of important topics, 
including constitutional law.  And under state law, as we have shown in this Article, 
the corporation is an entity, not an association. The fact that corporations are entities 
and not associations of shareholders explains why shareholders enjoy limited liability.  
It explains why corporations can enter into contracts and sue and be sued.  The entity 
theory also explains why corporations are not located in the states in which their 
shareholders are citizens, but rather in the states in which their headquarters are 
located for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.  And the entity theory explains why 
corporations face criminal liability for their actions and are responsible for paying 
taxes. 
Since at least 1841, corporations in the U.S. uniformly have been viewed as 
entities under state law in light of the fact that the existential purpose of a corporation 
was to allow for the creation of an entity that could transact business in the same way 
that natural person would do so.182  Corporations are creatures of state law.  Based on 
prior practice in the federal courts that accepted this reality, one would have to 
conclude that the unsupported assertion in Citizens United that the corporation is not 
an entity but an association of shareholders is an application of state law.  But an 
application of a state law principle so accepted that there was no need to cite prior 
                                                 
182 The People v. Assessors of Watertown, 1 Hill 616, 620-21 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1841). 
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authority embracing it.  Yet, there is absolutely no support for this stark assertion in 
the law of any state, it is instead just a belief statement of five judges.  
A. Hybrid Forms of Business Organization 
Thus far our Article has focused on two forms of business organization, the 
general partnership and the corporation.  Because the purpose of this Article is to 
explore the existential nature of the corporation and to demonstrate why the 
corporation is, in essence, a legal entity and not an association of individuals, we have 
found it useful to concentrate on these two modal forms of business organization.  
Once one introduces the existence of additional forms of business organization, our 
argument becomes stronger.  Hybrid forms of business organization such as limited 
liability companies (LLCs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs), and limited 
partnerships (LPs) have some of the characteristics of an entity/corporation and some 
of the characteristics of an association of persons/general partnership.  Thus, when 
one considers the full range of different types of business organizations, the 
corporation can be viewed as located at the extreme pole on a continuum that runs 
from clear and unambiguous entities to clear and unambiguous associations of 
persons, with LLCs, LLPs and LPs occupying the intermediate space on the 
continuum.   
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1.  The Limited Partnership 
The limited partnership form of business organization represents an early 
attempt to create a business form that would combine the pass-through tax attributes 
of a partnership with the limited liability protections of the corporation.183  Like 
corporations, limited partnerships are creatures of state statutes in that, unlike 
partnerships, they are not formed merely by the actions of the owners “carrying on as 
co-owners of a business for profit,” but rather by complying with the formation 
requirements of a relevant state statute.184   
Limited partnerships are comprised of (at least) one general partner, which may 
be a corporation or other limited liability entity, and one or more limited partners.185  
The general partner has unlimited liability for the contract and tort liabilities of the 
                                                 
183 “Limited partnerships, which were used in the early twentieth century to avoid personal liability 
of the partners, became the subject of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act in 1916.”  Robert A. 
Stein, Strengthening Federalism: The Uniform State Law Movement in the United States, 99 MINN. 
L. REV. 2253, 2260 (2015).   
184 MACEY, MOLL & HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 841; see also 6 Del. C. § 17-201(a) (“In order 
to form a limited partnership, 1 or more persons (but not less than all of the general partners) must 
execute a certificate of limited partnership.  The certificate of limited partnership shall be filed in 
the Office of the Secretary of State . . .”); SAUNDERS, LAND, & VOSS, 4 FOLK ON THE DELAWARE 
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 17-208.01 (6th ed) (“The fact that a certificate of limited 
partnership is on file with the Secretary of State is notice that the partnership is a limited 
partnership.”). 
185 6 Del. C. § 17-201(a) (requiring general partners be listed in the certificate of limited 
partnership); see also Buchwalter et. al., 68 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM PARTNERSHIP § 557 (“A 
limited partnership is a type of partnership composed of one or more general partners who manage 
the business and are personally liable for the partnership’s debts, and one or more limited partners 
who contribute capital and share in the profits but who take no part in running the business and 
incur no liability with respect to partnership obligations beyond their contribution.”).   
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limited partnership.186  The liability of the limited partners is limited to the amount of 
their investments, so long as they do not participate in the control of the business to 
an extent that triggers liability under the applicable statute, a standard which is 
considered threateningly vague by many investors.187   
Generally speaking, limited partners, like shareholders, have no say in the 
strategic direction or operation of the business.188  The general partner of the limited 
partnership runs the business, although sometimes limited partners have voting rights 
that allow them to displace the general partner, a right that is exercised very seldom.   
Although statutes generally do not address the question of whether limited 
partnerships are separate legal entities, limited partnerships possess a number of 
characteristics, particularly limited liability for the obligations of the business, which 
                                                 
186 6 Del. C. § 17-403(b) (“[A] general partner of a limited partnership has the liabilities of a partner 
in a partnership that is governed by the Delaware Uniform Partnership Law . . . to persons other 
than the partnership and the other partners.”); see also Buchwalter et. al., 68 CORPUS JURIS 
SECUNDUM PARTNERSHIP § 557.   
187 6 Del. C. § 17-303(a) (“A limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership 
unless he or she is also a general partner or, in addition to the exercise of the rights and powers of 
a limited partner, he or she participates in the control of the business.  However, if the limited 
partner does participate in the control of the business, he or she is liable only to persons who 
transact business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited 
partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner.”). 
188 Life Care Centers of Am., Inc. v. Charles Town Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 79 F.3d 496, 503 (6th Cir. 
1996) (“The modus operandi of limited partnerships is an important reason why the ‘aggregate’ 
theory of partnerships is not always applicable in this context.  Limited partnerships are business 
organizations in which the limited partners are precluded by law from participating in the operation 
of the partnership.”); Buchwalter et. al., 68 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM PARTNERSHIP § 586 
(“Limited partnerships are business organizations in which limited partners are precluded by law 
from participating in the operation of the partnership.”).   
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suggest that they are separate legal entities.189  In particular, limited partners can seek 
to bring derivative lawsuits by or in the right of the entity,190 just as corporate 
shareholders can.191  And the dissociation of a limited (or a general) partner from the 
limited partnership does not result in the dissolution of the limited partnership.192  As 
such, courts have generally treated limited partnerships organized under the Revised 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act as legal entities distinct from their owners.193  And 
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act treats the limited partnership as “an entity 
distinct from its partners.”194   
Delaware, the leading U.S. state for entity formation, adopts a mixed approach 
to limited partnerships.  “[B]y statute, the parties to a Delaware limited partnership 
have the power and discretion to form and operate a limited partnership ‘in an 
environment of private ordering’ according to the provisions in the limited partnership 
                                                 
189 MACEY, MOLL & HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 851; see also SAUNDERS, LAND, & VOSS, 4 FOLK 
ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW §17-201.03 (“A limited partnership is a distinct 
legal entity separate from its partners.  A limited partnership is not a ‘natural person,’ and is a 
‘statutory creature not existing at common law.’”) (citations omitted).   
190 6 Del. C. § 17-1001 (“A limited partner or an assignee of a partnership interest may bring an 
action in the Court of Chancery in the right of a limited partnership to recover a judgment in its 
favor if general partners with authority to do so have refused to bring the action or if an effort to 
cause those general partners to bring the action is not likely to succeed.”).   
191 MACEY, MOLL & HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 851. 
192 6 Del. C. § 17-702(a)(2) (“An assignment of a partnership interest does not dissolve a limited 
partnership or entitle the assignee to become or to exercise any rights or powers of a partner.”).   
193 MACEY, MOLL & HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 851; Hart Holding Co v. Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Inc., Civ. A No. 11514, 1991 WL 236228, at *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 1991) (“Glencoe, as a 
limited partnership, is a distinct legal entity which is separate from its partners.”) (Allen, C.).   
194 ULPA § 104(a). 
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agreement.”195  A Delaware Limited Partnership “is a creature of both statute and 
contract.”196  But although contractual flexibility provides substantial leeway to 
modify the relationship, certain statutory formalities, such as filing with the Secretary 
of State, must be adhered to for the “Limited Partnership” moniker to attach.197  Most 
important, as under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a Delaware Limited 
Partnership is an entity in its own right, distinct from its limited partners.198   
2. The Limited Liability Partnership 
The limited liability partnership is a statutory creation based conceptually on 
the general partnership.  But the enabling statutes that permit the creation of LLPs 
provide that the contract and tort liability of partners in LLPs is limited to the amount 
of their initial investments, as is the case for shareholders in corporations and for 
limited partners in limited partnerships.199  Because partnership statutes typically 
provide that LLPs are partnerships, a state’s general partnership law is generally 
                                                 
195 Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 170 (Del. 2002).   
196 Twin Bridges Ltd. P’ship v. Draper, No. Civ. A 2351-VCP, 2007 WL 2744609 at *9 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 14, 2007).   
197 Gotham Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d at 170 (“We have noted that DRULPA [Delaware Revised 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act] embodies “the policy of freedom of contract” and “maximum 
flexibility.”  DRULPA’s “basic approach is to permit partners to have the broadest possible 
discretion in drafting their partnership agreements and to furnish answers only in situations where 
the partners have not expressly made provisions in their partnership agreement” or “where the 
agreement is inconsistent with mandatory statutory provisions.”). 
198 Hart Holding, 1991 WL 236228, at *6. 
199 E.g., 6 Del. C. § 17-214(d) (“If a limited partnership is a limited liability limited 
partnership, . . . no limited partner of the limited partnership shall have any liability for the 
obligations of the limited partnership . . . .”).   
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applicable to LLPs, absent provisions to the contrary in the foundational LLP 
agreement.200 
The applicability of general partnership law to LLPs suggests that, generally 
speaking, LLPs are associations of their partners, not entities.  Unlike corporations, 
the default rule for LLPs is that each partner has a right to participate in the 
management of the business.201  Significantly, in LLPs, the default rule is that a 
unanimous vote of the partners is required for the admission of a new partner.202 
3. The Limited Liability Company 
The limited liability company is a non-corporate business structure whose 
equity investors, who are known as “members,” have limited liability for the 
contractual and tort obligations of the business, like shareholders in corporations.  But 
LLCs also have the pass-through tax status of partnerships, and virtually unfettered 
flexibility and discretion to organize their corporate governance and internal 
operations through intra-firm contracting.203  As with LPs and LLPs, the primary 
reason for forming an LLC is to create a structure that offers investors the corporate 
law feature of limited liability and the partnership law feature of pass-through tax 
status.  The two distinct advantages of the LLC structure are: (1) the fact that there is 
                                                 
200 RUPA §§ 101(5), 102(9).   
201 Id. §§ 401(f), 401(h); UPA § 18(e). 
202 UPA § 18(g); RUPA §§ 401(i), 401(b)(3).   
203 See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 57, § 20 (The LLC “combin[es] the organization flexibility and 
pass-through tax treatment of a partnership with the limited liability protection of a corporation”). 
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more certainty about the limited liability feature in the LLC than there is in the limited 
partnership because involvement by LLC members in the operation of the LLC will 
not jeopardize the limited liability status of such active members in the way that such 
involvement jeopardizes the limited liability status of limited partners in limited 
partnerships; and (2) the tremendous flexibility in the organizational structure of 
LLCs.  The LLC is a tremendously popular form of business organization, with new 
LLCs being formed in the U.S. at twice the rate at which new corporations are being 
formed.204  
The corporate form remains the dominant form of business organization for 
publicly traded firms, although a small number of LLCs and LPs are publicly traded.205  
Venture capital firms eschew the LLC form of business organization, and it is 
generally not possible for an LLC to make an initial public offering of securities.  
Thus, despite the popularity of LLCs, the corporation remains the dominant form of 
business organization for large public enterprises, although this could change in the 
                                                 
204  Rodney Chrisman, LLCs are the New King of the Hill, 15 FORD. J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 
459-462 (2010). 
205 Suren Gompstian, The Governance of Publicly Traded LLCs, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 
5, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/01/05/the-governance-of-publicly-traded-llcs 
(counting twenty-two publicly listed LLCs as of 2016); List of Current MLPs & MLP Funds, 
MLPA, https://www.mlpassociation.org/mlp-101/list-of-current-mlps (last updated Aug. 3, 2018) 
(listing 112 publicly traded limited partnerships as of 2018); Michael J. Mauboussin et al., The 
Incredible Shrinking Universe of Stocks, CREDIT SUISSE (Mar. 22, 2017), 
http://www.cmgwealth.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/document_1072753661.pdf (recording 
3,671 listed companies in 2016). 
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future.206  Because of the flexible nature of the LLC, the LLC in its “off the rack” 
format is a legal entity.   
That said, because of the LLC’s flexible nature, a given LLC may more closely 
resemble either a legal entity or an association, depending on how it is structured.  In 
most states, an LLC may be structured as either “member-managed” or “manager-
managed.”207  In a member-managed LLC, each individual member has the authority 
to bind the entity, whereas in a manager-managed LLC, only the managers have the 
authority to bind the entity.208  In this respect, the member-managed LLC corresponds 
more to the partnership model, while the manager-managed LLC tends to approximate 
the corporate form.  By default, Delaware law adopts the member-managed model, 
but it also allows the LLC agreement to provide for a manager-managed structure (or 
something in between).209  The Court of Chancery has advised it will analogize to 
partnership law for standard member-managed LLCs, limited partnership law for 
LLCs with a single managing member and other passive, non-managing members, 
and corporate law for manager-managed LLCs with corporate features such as a board 
of directors.210  It would therefore be easy to imagine that investors could form an LLC 
                                                 
206 Mary Siegel, Publicly-Traded LLCs: The New Kid on the Exchange, 68 S.M.U. L. REV. 885 
(2015). 
207 1 FLETCHER, supra note 57, § 20. 
208 Id. 
209 See 6 Del. C. § 18.402 (vesting “the management of a limited liability company . . . in its 
members” by default, but allowing for “a limited liability company agreement [to] provide[] for 
the management, in whole or in part, of a limited liability company by a manager”). 
210 See Obeid v. Hogan, C.A. No. 11900-VCL, slip op. at 11–13 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016). 
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that so closely resembles a partnership that it would be more accurate to characterize 
it as an association than as a separate and discrete entity.  At the same time, it would 
also be easy to imagine an LLC that squarely fits the entity model.  In either case, the 
LLC retains the central feature that distinguishes legal entities from associations: 
limited liability and a legal identity distinct from those who own its equity.211  By way 
of example, members cannot sue in the name of the LLC but must proceed 
derivatively, as in corporate law.212   
It should be noted, however, that, as discussed above,213 state law often 
explicitly determines whether the LLC has entity status.  In Delaware, for example, 
the relevant statute provides that a “limited liability company formed under this 
chapter shall be a separate legal entity, the existence of which as a separate legal entity 
shall continue until cancellation of the limited liability company’s certificate of 
formation.”214  As such, it may be the case that, as in Delaware, state law has made a 
definitive legal determination about the existential status of a particular form of legal 
entity, in which case, of course, no further inquiry would be required. 
                                                 
211 6 Del. C. § 18-106(b); see also CompoSecure, L.L.C. v. CardUX, LLC, 2018 WL 660178, at 
*26 (Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 2018) (Laster, V.C.) (“Section 18–106(b) of the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act (the ‘LLC Act’) recognizes that a duly formed LLC is a legally distinct entity.”).     
212 6 Del. C. § 18-1001 (“A member or an assignee of a limited liability company interest may 
bring an action in the Court of Chancery in the right of a limited liability company to recover a 
judgment in its favor if managers or members with authority to do so have refused to bring the 
action or if an effort to cause those managers or members to bring the action is not likely to 
succeed.”).   
213 See supra TAN XX-XX. 
214 6 Del. C. § 18-201. 
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B. Non-Profit Corporations 
To this point, we have focused on business entities because they are the 
biggest aggregators of wealth and these are the entities likely to have been on 
Congress’s mind when it adopted McCain-Feingold.  But the corporations for which 
it is most justifiable, we suppose, to ignore basic principles of corporate law and 
treat as “associations of their stockholders” are non-profit corporations that have as 
their primary purpose advancing a particular cause.  Corporations like this do exist, 
of course, and we do not deny that speaking out on behalf of their causes is central 
to their purpose.   
But, that centrality does not change the legal facts.  Even non-profit 
corporations are distinct from their stockholders, or more typically, their members.215  
                                                 
215 Laurie Bennett, Who Knew That Cato Had Shareholders?, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lauriebennett/2012/03/02/who-knew-that-cato-had-
shareholders/#4f1b05918932 (“You don’t see 501(c)(3)s with shareholders very often.” (quoting 
Jeffrey S. Tenenbaum, chairman of the non-profit practice at Venable LLP) (discussing the Cato 
Institute, a non-profit which had shareholders until 2012); e.g.,15 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5103 (West) (defining members of non-profits to include “[a] shareholder of a corporation, if the 
corporation issues shares of stock”); Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporations, PA. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.dos.pa.gov/BusinessCharities/Business/Resources/Pages/Pennsylvania-Nonprofit-
Corporations-.aspx (“Nonprofit corporations are those corporations whose members or 
shareholders may not receive any of the pecuniary [monetary] profits of the corporation.”); 
MARILYN E. PHELAN, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 1:51, 3.1 (2d ed.) (noting that “[w]hile 
most states prohibit nonprofit corporations from issuing shares of stock, some states do permit 
nonprofit corporations to issue shares of stock,” and that Pennsylvania corporations can be “both 
stock or nonstock corporations”).  But see George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance without 
Shareholders: A Cautionary Lesson From Non-Profit Organizations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 93, 97-98 
(2014) (although most non-profit corporations have boards of directors, “[u]nlike business 
corporation, however, the boards of [non-profit corporations] are not elected by shareholders 
because [non-profit organizations] have no shareholders”). 
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It is precisely for the important benefits that come from being an entity that such 
corporations are formed.216  In the leading incorporation state, Delaware, non-profit 
corporations cannot have shareholders.217  And in keeping with the distinction 
between for-profit and non-profit organizations, the ABA endorses a Model 
Business Corporation Act for business organizations and a separate Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act for non-profit organizations.  Most states following the model acts, 
therefore, have distinct statutes for business corporations and non-profits.218  To this 
                                                 
216 E.g., PHELAN, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 215, § 1:64 (“Most nonprofits are 
incorporated.  The corporate form provides limited liability, centralized management, and more 
defined and flexible operational guidelines.”); id. § 1:2 (“Benefits provided nonprofit 
organizations that are not available to profit organizations make operation as a nonprofit attractive.  
Most, though not all, nonprofit organizations are exempt from federal income taxation.  Securities 
issued by some nonprofit organizations are not subject to the Securities Act of 1933.  Nonprofit 
organizations cannot be subjected to involuntary bankruptcy.  In the absence of an intent or purpose 
to affect the commercial aspects of a profession, the applicability of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
applicability to nonprofit organizations is limited.  Nonprofit organizations having no shares of 
stock and that do not carry on business for their own profit or that of their members (within the 
meaning of the word profit as attributed to profit organizations), are not subject to regulation by 
the Federal Trade Commission as to charges of unfair competition.”). 
217 Id. § 1:20 (noting that Delaware law does not authorize non-profit corporations to issue stock).  
Although the Revised Model Non-Profit Act does permit non-profits to issue shares, it is rather 
uncommon for non-profits to do so.  See generally ALI–ABA, Model Nonprofit Corporation Act 
(2008); see also Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 206 (1982) 
(“Most states apparently permit nonprofit corporations to have “members’ similar to shareholders 
in a business corporation, although state statutes generally do not seem to require this form of 
organization; in many states the Board of Directors of a nonprofit corporation may be an 
autonomous, self-perpetuating body.”) (citations omitted); Henry Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit 
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 575–78 (1981) (discussing the different states’ 
approaches to non-profit formation).   
218 For example, California has a Corporations code with specific chapters for “General 
Corporation Law” and “Nonprofit Corporation Law.”  Compare Cal. Corp. Code Div. 1, with Cal. 
Corp. Code Div. 2.  Likewise, New York has a “Business Corporation Law” code and a “Not-for-
Profit Corporation Law” code.  Compare N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 101 et seq. (McKinney), with 
N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 101 et seq. (McKinney). 
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point, Citizens United, the litigant, was a non-stock, non-profit membership 
corporation incorporated in Virginia with an expressive purpose.219  Therefore, if 
Citizens United the corporation was an “association of citizens,”220 it was not one 
involving an association of shareholders.  But Citizens United, the judicial decision, 
was not about just non-profit corporations.  If Citizens United, as a case, had applied 
only to non-profits, it would not have had much effect.   
Now, we concede that as to non-profit corporations formed for a specific 
charitable or other non-profit purpose, it is more logical to assume that the members 
are united in their support of that purpose.  The reason for that is obvious, which is 
that the members cannot expect any economic return and therefore can be presumed 
to have become a member solely because of their interest in advancing the entity’s 
stated non-profit goals.221  To that end, Professor Hansmann has observed that “the 
corporate law that has been developed for business corporations, and particularly 
                                                 
219 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, Joint Appendix at 10A, 2009 WL 62995 (Jan. 8, 
2009) (Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Dec. 21, 2007)).  
Virginia has a separate code for “Stock” and “Nonstock” corporations.  Compare Va. Code Ann. 
§ 13.1-601 et seq., with Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-801 et seq.  Virginia nonstock corporations, of 
which Citizens Untied was, are not allowed to issue dividends to their members and are effectively 
non-profit organizations.  Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-814 (West) (“A corporation shall not issue shares 
of stock.  No dividend shall be paid and no part of the income of a corporation shall be distributed 
to its members, directors or officers, except that a corporation may make distributions to another 
nonprofit corporation that is a member of such corporation or has the power to appoint one or more 
of its directors.”).   
220 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349.   
221 See generally PHELAN, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 215, § 1:1 (“A nonprofit 
organization, whether incorporated or operated as a trust or as an unincorporated association, is an 
organization in which no part of the income is distributable to its members, directors, or officers.”). 
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that which concerns the fiduciary obligations of corporate management, often 
provides a poor model for nonprofit corporation law.”222 
Most essential to our argument in this article is the law’s treatment of for-
profit corporations, which have as their goal the attainment of profits for the benefit 
of their stockholders.  In Citizens United, the Supreme Court accepted as to all 
corporations, including those most relevant to society in terms of their effect on the 
fairness of our polity’s electoral process, a view that it has refused to adhere to in 
other contexts.  As important, Citizens United failed to take into account basic 
differences between business corporations and non-profit corporations: differences 
that the Court has acknowledged and recognized in other cases. 
For example, the Supreme Court has consistently denied for-profit 
corporations standing to sue to vindicate the rights of their stockholders.223  But in 
the context of non-profit membership corporations, the Supreme Court has allowed 
them standing to sue on behalf of their members because their members are deemed 
                                                 
222 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L. J. 835, 845 (1980). 
223 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (“In the 
ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons.”) (citing Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 
(1982) (“In determining whether [a corporation] has standing . . . we conduct the same inquiry as 
in the case of an individual.”); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (holding that to 
establish concrete injury—standing analysis’s first prong—“a mere ‘interest in a problem’ no 
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating 
the problem, is not sufficient by itself.”).   
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to be united in their relevant values and to have joined the membership corporation 
to advance those values.224 
As to the failure of Citizens United to hew to the same distinctions in 
addressing McCain-Feingold, it also is important to recognize how membership 
organizations typically fund their activities, including those involving speech.  It is 
not by using funds contributed by their members in their capacity as members. 
Rather, these corporations raise money by voluntary, tax-subsidized 
charitable contributions.225  Members, typically involved as directors, are usually 
                                                 
224 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342–45 (1977) (“Even in the 
absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its 
members.”) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)).  The Supreme Court has held 
that associational standing attaches to an organization “when: (a) its members would otherwise 
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the 
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”  Id. at 343.  Admittedly, in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014), the Supreme Court allowed the for-profit 
Hobby Lobby corporation to sue to vindicate the religious beliefs of the family that controlled a 
majority of the corporation’s equity.  Like Citizens United, Hobby Lobby can be seen as a case 
where, for similar ideological reasons, the majority took a view of corporations it fails to embrace 
in other areas of law.  The Court failed to address constitutional standing in Hobby Lobby, but 
nonetheless held that a for-profit corporation is a “person” and entitled to statutory standing under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).  134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014); see 
also Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 141–
44 (2014) (highlighting that Hobby Lobby “addressed the separate claims brought by individual 
owners themselves” and warning that “the notion that the owners could sue on behalf of legally 
separate corporations would raise still more problematic issues of third-party standing”). 
225 See generally PHELAN, 1 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 215, § 1:2 (“[N]onprofit 
organizations have financing problems.  Equity financing is not available, and debt financing can 
be difficult to obtain.  Reliance upon donations can be illusory.  The founders, members, directors, 
and officers of a nonprofit organization cannot share in any profits the organization may generate.  
As noted above, there can be no distribution of profits of nonprofit organizations.  Founders, 
members, directors, and officers can only be paid a reasonable salary for services they perform for 
the organizations.”). 
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expected to donate heavily to the charity and, more important, to help raise funds.226  
But, the key point is that these corporations do not in fact use corporate funds 
donated by their equity investors to fund their speech activities.  Rather, these 
corporations must do exactly what was permitted by McCain-Feingold’s PAC 
authorization: seek out voluntary donations based on donors’ support for the causes 
and positions adhered to by the corporation.   
Precisely because of these realities, non-profit corporations pose little danger 
of compelled speech using funds freighted by a legal and equitable obligation toward 
the corporations’ equity holders.  That is because, as was required of unions under 
Abood and its progeny,227 and as was required by McCain-Feingold for both 
corporations and unions,228 non-profit corporations must fund their speech by 
specifically raising funds voluntarily for that purpose from donors.  As we have 
shown, no responsible commentator on American corporate law on the left or the 
                                                 
226 “68 percent of nonprofit organizations have a policy requiring board members to make a 
personal contribution on an annual basis.  Boards average 74 percent participation in giving.”  THE 
BRIDGESPAN GROUP, BOARD MEMBERS AND PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS (2010), 
https://www.bridgespan.org/bridgespan/images/articles/board-members-and-personal-
contributions/BoardMembersPersonalContributions.pdf?ext=.pdf; see also Hansmann, The Role 
of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 222, at 877 (“Because nonprofits are unable to sell equity 
shares, they must rely largely upon donations, retained earnings, and debt for capital financing. 
The funds available from these sources may, however, be poorly matched to the capital needs of 
the organization. Donations may reflect merely the whims of contributors.”).  Although there are 
some non-profits—termed “commercial nonprofits”—that “receive the bulk of their income from 
prices charged for their services,” such as nursing homes and hospitals, the non-profits most likely 
to be a collective of individuals advocating for a cause are “donative nonprofits,” “that receive 
most or all of their income in the form of grants or donations.”  Id. at 840–41.  
227 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 233–36.   
228 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2).  
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right believes that stockholders in American business corporations invest in their 
stock because they desire to have those corporations engage in political speech on 
their behalf.  Any belief of that kind ignores all relevant empirical facts known about 
corporations and their stockholders. 
 
  




In this Article we have championed three ideas.  First and foremost we have 
argued that the core assertion on which the Supreme Court’s opinion in Citizens 
United is based, which is that a corporation is an “associations of shareholders”229 is 
wrong.  The corporation is not an association of citizens or even shareholders, either 
under law, or in a theoretical sense.  The whole point of the corporate form is to create 
a discrete legal entity separate and apart from its shareholders.  Unless such a separate 
entity is created when a corporation is formed then the basic objective of the 
corporation, which is to create an economic framework for amassing capital to be 
deployed in economic activity, cannot be reached.   
In arguing that corporations are economic entities with rights and obligations 
separate and apart from their shareholders we make two ancillary points. First, we 
show that, as a matter of logic and theory, the corporation cannot be conceptualized 
simultaneously as an entity and as an association of shareholders.  These conceptions 
of the corporation are logical alternatives: they are substitutes not complements.  The 
corporation is, from an analytical perspective, an alternative form of business 
organization to the partnership form.  The partnership is an association of the partners 
who own the enterprise.  The point of allowing the creation of corporations is to create 
                                                 
229 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349. 
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a legal framework to permit the formation of business organizations that are entities 
rather than associations of shareholders.   
Finally, moving from logic to authority we observe that, to the extent that the 
question of whether a business organization is an entity or an association of 
shareholders can be viewed as a matter of fact determined by the state law that creates 
the organization in addition to being viewed as an existential matter.  Supreme Court 
precedent clearly establishes that state law, rather than federal law, is the appropriate 
source for determining whether a corporation is an entity or an association of 
shareholders. And state law is clear that corporations are entities separate and apart 
from their shareholders.   
Thus, whatever one might say about Citizens United from a constitutional law 
perspective, the case is bad corporate law.  The majority opinion mischaracterizes the 
corporation, describing it as an “association of shareholders” when it is, in reality, a 
separate and distinct legal entity.  The flaws in the opinion are severe and manifest in 
light of the fact that the Court provides no basis for the assertion that the corporation 
is an association of shareholders and fails to recognize that corporations are creatures 
of state law, and therefore state law rules should guide our understanding about the 
essential nature of these entities.   
Perhaps worst of all, the Court’s decision struck down bipartisan legislation that 
allowed business corporations broad license to engage in political speech, but only 
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required that they do so using funds specifically raised from voluntary donation by 
their constituents—including stockholders.  By this means, Congress left business 
corporations with substantial expressive rights, but through means that took into 
account the actual facts about what business corporations are and what they are not.  
In the name of vindicating the expressive rights of American investors, the Court 
therefore compelled millions of ordinary Americans to endure the involuntary use of 
their equity capital for a purpose that they did not authorize and that has no rational 
connection to their decision to invest. 
 
 
 
